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THE ELUSIVE ―POEM OF THE WORLD‖: THE TASK OF THE READER AND THE
PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN HEINRICH VON KLEIST‘S NOVELLAS DIE
MARQUISE VON O… AND DAS ERDBEBEN IN CHILI
Chairperson: Dr. Elizabeth Ametsbichler
The literary works of Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811) have long been an important
influence on thinkers and writers interested and engaged in the German cultural
tradition, particularly due to the enigmatic and highly problematic nature of his narrative
approach. In recent years, however, there has been a notable surge of interest in Kleist‘s
works, which has led to the production of several articles, papers, and even entire
conference panels dedicated to the investigation of his oeuvre from various angles. Why
does Kleist still fascinate his readers so much, and what is it about his texts that allow for
such a large and varied body of interpretation? In this thesis, I will argue that it is crucial
to examine closely the interface of text and reader when analyzing Kleist‘s novellas,
specifically Die Marquise von O… and Das Erdbeben in Chili. I will then attempt to
establish a link between Kleist‘s unique reaction to the philosophical debates concerning
epistemology and aesthetics that were taking place during his short lifetime and the
experience of the reader when confronting Kleist‘s texts. I will examine these questions
first with the aid of narratology and reader-response theory, particularly by examining
the issues of closure and focalization in the two narratives. Furthermore, I will illustrate
how a narratological/reader-response approach to Kleist‘s work can also inform a feminist
critical approach and, likewise, how a feminist analysis can complement the former. In
the final chapter, I will conduct a feminist analysis, focusing on both form and content in
the two novellas to show how Kleist‘s work both structurally and thematically challenges
―male‖ Enlightenment values such as order and logic. These analyses ultimately illustrate
how Kleist displaced the philosophical questions with which he was grappling into the
realm of the text-reader interface, thus emulating and illuminating with this relationship
the self‘s quest for knowledge and meaning in the world.
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INTRODUCTION
CONTEXTUALIZING KLEIST: THE VIABILITY OF TRUTH AND REPRESENTATION
UNDER INVESTIGATION

How can being or presence effectively be mediated or represented? Furthermore,
once something is ―represented,‖ what is the perceiver‘s relationship with it—that is, can
one really come to ―know‖ something through its representation? Likewise, how do we
self-represent, and can we ever come to know ourselves? Questions such as these that
deal with the problems of representation, perception, and interpretation were central
issues in German Idealist and Romantic discourse around 1800, particularly as reactions
to Immanuel Kant‘s epistemological philosophy and his discussion of the notion of

Darstellung in his Critiques.1 The term Darstellung, which Martha Helfer defines in her
work The Retreat of Representation as ―sensible presentation, presencing, or
representation,‖ was introduced as a new type of representation that would consciously
avoid or oppose mimetic representation (Vorstellung) and its ―objectifying‖ nature (2). An
objectifying, mimetic approach to representation leads, namely, to the problem that the
representations themselves, rather than those objects or ideas they are intended to
represent, begin to form our perception of—and thus also our basis of—truth. If, in turn,
our understanding of the universe and ourselves is based merely on representations
thereof, then we are subject to the confinement of ―knowing‖ things only as they ―seem‖

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]), Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of
Practical Reason [1788]), and Kritik der Urtheilskraft (Critique of Judgment [1790]).
1
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and not as they actually are. This problematic plays a key role in Heinrich von Kleist‘s
literary approach.
The often quite enigmatic literary works written by Kleist—a figure considered
by some to be a part of the German Romantic movement and by others ultimately to
―stand alone‖ with regard to a literary category—can be investigated and, to a certain
extent, also demystified by analyzing some of these central issues as they emerged in
philosophical and literary discourse during some of his most formative years. Kleist was a
disillusioned and troubled but nonetheless inspired young writer who composed works
that, in a rather intriguing manner, address some of the fundamental existential and
aesthetic questions we still face today. His work seems to have the ability to strike a
common chord in readers—or, as Bernd Fischer points out in the introduction to his
edited volume A Companion to the Works of Heinrich von Kleist: ―As any German
teacher or any analysis of the history of German studies can attest, readers and scholars
alike continue to find immediate and personal access to Kleist‘s aesthetic, and many
continue to be amazed at how Kleist‘s works foreshadow the concerns and literary tastes
of generations of readers‖ (1). He is an example of one young intellectual whose
―Auseinandersetzung mit dem herrschenden Paradigma seiner Zeit (das vielleicht immer
noch am treffendesten mit dem epochalen Schlagwort Idealismus gefasst wird)‖ was not
fully appreciated during his lifetime (Mehigan 184); however, an examination of his
literary treatment, or ―working through,‖ of the paradoxes of his time can perhaps enable
us to understand the effects generated by the works of Kant and other thinkers as they
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exposed some of the fundamental problems underlying ―Enlightenment thought‖ and its
main assumptions. Likewise, Kleist‘s literary legacy can serve as a reminder that our own
assumptions about the world and the paradigms of our time can and should be called into
question.
In Kleist‘s case, there appears to be a relatively high degree of consensus about his
background and intellectual development. He was born in 1777, and we know that he
was raised and educated within the Weltanschauung of the Enlightenment tradition and,
for the most part, not only accepted but also deeply believed in its corresponding ideals—
such as reason, order, education, self-development, and progress—into his early twenties.
Fischer discusses a turning point in Kleist‘s ideological position, however, that is traceable
in some of the correspondence he carried out around the age of twenty-three: ―At this
time Kleist presented himself as an adherent of an early Enlightenment road map to
human fulfillment: the achieving of happiness through virtue and education. Yet, a closer
reading can detect the first seeds of doubt‖ (3). Later, Kleist‘s crisis became much more
explicit in his letters to his fiancée, Wilhelmine von Zenge, as well as in the following
lines to his sister, Ulrike:
Es scheint, als ob ich eines von den Opfern der Torheit werden würde, deren
die Kantische Philosophie so viele auf das Gewissen hat. Mich ekelt vor dieser
Gesellschaft, und doch kann ich mich nicht losringen aus ihren Banden. Der
Gedanke, daß das, was wir hier Wahrheit nennen, nach dem Tode ganz anders
heißt, und daß folglich das Bestreben, sich ein Eigentum zu erwerben, das uns
3

auch in das Grab folgt, ganz vergeblich und fruchtlos ist, dieser Gedanke hat mich
in dem Heiligtum meiner Seele erschüttert—Mein einziges und höchstes Ziel ist
gesunken, ich habe keines mehr. (Sämtliche Werke und Briefe 636)
Kleist had come across the works of Immanuel Kant and pursued them in hopes of
expanding his ―collection of truths‖ about the world and how one should live in it, and
his optimism was suddenly upturned with the realization of the possibility that if
knowledge is subjective, it must pass away when we do: ―Ich glaubte, daß wir einst nach
dem Tode von der Stufe der Vervollkommnung [sic], die wir auf diesem Sterne
erreichten, auf einem andern weiter fortschreiten würden, und daß wir den Schatz von
Wahrheiten, den wir hier sammelten, auch dort einst brauchen könnten‖ (Sämtliche

Werke und Briefe 633). In the end, however, he clearly discovered something far from
the comfort of education and knowledge that he was accustomed to and the
reinforcement that he had sought in pursuit of the greater ―truths‖ of the world. It seems
to have been primarily Kant‘s presentation of the ultimate unknowability of ―noumena‖
(things as they are) and the consequent knowability only of ―phenomena‖ (things as they
appear) that threw Kleist into the disillusionment that would eventually evolve into a
deep existential crisis. Many scholars point to this so-called ―Kant crisis,‖ which is further
elaborated upon in other letters, as an explanation for Kleist‘s turning point.
His work that stemmed from this crisis might also be viewed more generally as a
symptom of cultural crisis elicited by the troubling paradoxes of his time. Namely, while
Kleist‘s reaction to these concepts and the consequent character of his literary production
4

might be considered unique, his confrontation with the notions of the ―unknowability‖ of
the world is certainly not a uniquely Kleistian experience: an entire movement of
German Idealism was inaugurated by the publication of Kant‘s critical philosophy, which,
in turn, had marked effects on the literary realm, particularly on early German
Romanticism. In her work Representation and its Discontents: The Critical Legacy of

German Romanticism, Azade Seyhan connects this epistemological problematic of
―knowability‖ with the crisis of representation, which, as mentioned above, was a key
motivation for Romantic critical discourse: ―Since representation can never fully recover
presence or coincide ideally with it, it will always pursue strategies to cover absence. […]
The recognition that some primary presence or truth remains inaccessible to
consciousness lies at the heart of the problem of representation‖ (4). Seyhan points out
that these various interrelated ―crises‖ also corresponded with the aftermath of the
French Revolution, and that the subsequent destabilization of social and political
certainty evoked not only a general anxiety but also an intellectual anxiety that
accompanied the sudden need to question the actual capacity of human reason and to
reexamine its limits. In short, sociopolitical tensions contributed to the initiation of a
paradigm shift in which several different kinds of intellectuals were eager to participate.
Hence, the Jena Romantics most certainly had been exposed to these very questions that
pervaded the intellectual sphere at the time and were indeed motivated by them to a
great extent. The nature of the early Romantics‘ literary agenda as evidenced by related
discussions on the topic published in Athenäum,2 for instance, indicates that they were
2

Athenäum was a German literary journal that was published between 1798 and 1800. It was established by
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indeed acutely aware of the issue of the relativity of reality, particularly the impossibility
of representing the absolute—even though this was the ideal for which they ultimately
strived. This sense of engagement is apparent, among other things, in the Jena Romantics‘
participation in the ―Darstellung debate.‖
When Kant elaborated on the problematic of representation in his writings and
addressed Darstellung as a new approach through which one could seek to transcend
representation and its limits, this ―new notion […] quickly catapulted to the center of the
leading philosophical and aesthetic theories in the years between 1790 and 1810,‖ was
―perhaps the defining force of German Idealism and early German Romanticism […],‖
and was ―central to the linguistic and aesthetic theories of Romanticism‖ (Helfer 3, 9).
Much of Kant‘s transcendental philosophy, however, contained (often intentionally)
some very unresolved and thus problematic aspects that became controversial topics for
other thinkers to pursue, such as the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte and the Jena
Romantics. They attempted to remedy or supplement these shortcomings with their own
interpretations and elaborations, and in this manner, Kant‘s work had come to serve not
only as a provocation of discussion on the topics of aesthetics and epistemology (among
other things), but it had also become a springboard for several different reworkings of his
philosophy.
Kant used the term Darstellung in the above-mentioned sense of external
representation and also as a more technical, yet nonetheless relevant, term that referred

brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel and is commonly acknowledged as the founding
publication of German Romanticism.
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to the ―mediation of the imagination between sensibility and understanding, the two
branches of knowledge that form human cognition‖—in other words, it is the human
faculty to mentally represent or ―make sensible of a concept‖3 (Helfer 10). The discomfort
that arises with our awareness of the sublime, for instance, is caused by our recognition of
the failure of our cognitive ability to grasp its unlimitedness as a totality, and Kant refers
to this as a failure of our Darstellungsvermögen. Because Kant himself intended to
maintain a separation between philosophy and art, pure representation for him was
achievable not through pursuing a ―literary absolute,‖ as the Romantics would eventually
claim, but it could only arise through the self‘s contemplation of the sublime—that is,
through the negative Darstellung, or the indirect (yet pure) mental presentations inspired
by the sublime when one attempts to grasp that which exists beyond what our senses can
perceive. Helfer notes:

Negative Darstellung forces the subject to think the supersensible—the idea—
without actually producing an objective presentation of this idea. Thus, it presents
nothing except the process—the striving or effort (die Bestrebung)—of

Darstellung itself. It is self-presentation or Selbstdarstellung in the Romantic sense
of the word, and it is no coincidence that the notion of ―negativity‖ becomes
constitutive for Idealism and Romanticism. (45)
The fear and sense of discord that is initially evoked by the limitlessness of the sublime is,
according to Kant, assuaged by the faculty of reason, which—although it cannot help the
3

Helfer intends for the word ―sensible‖ to mean ―perceivable to the senses‖ (14–15).
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imagination represent it directly—nonetheless allows it to recognize that the sublime is
unrepresentable and can therefore still present the form of the unrepresentable. This, for
Kant, is pure representation, and the emphasis here on form as a key to achieving

Darstellung perhaps anticipates the importance of form for Romantic aesthetics.
One problematic aspect of Kantian philosophy, particularly from Fichte‘s
perspective, was Kant‘s treatment of the self—namely, the failure of the Kantian self to
represent itself to itself. In the words of Azade Seyhan, Fichte found fault in the fact that
―[t]he Kantian self is the site of the faculties and their interaction but lacks the facility for
self-representation. In other words, it lacks a posited consciousness or otherness that can
reflect on itself‖ (35). Helfer approaches the issue slightly differently, remarking that the
Kantian self ―cannot represent itself as a moral subject of reason‖ (11). Consequently,
Fichte created the idea of the ―self-positing subject,‖ through which he attempted to
establish that consciousness of the self can only exist if it has something external to
encounter and ―posit‖ (setzen) itself against. By positing those other beings or objects out
against oneself, one is able to affirm the existence of one‘s own consciousness—in other
words, the essence of an ―I‖—or ―self‖—by deducing it through the identification of
everything else that is the ―non-self.‖ For Fichte, self-consciousness is created through
self-reflexivity, and the positing process can eventually allow the self to be conscious of
itself as an ―autonomous moral being striving to become God‖ (Helfer 68). According to
Helfer, Fichte incorporates the notion of ―pure representation‖ into this model and
attempts thus to solve one of the ―gaps‖ left open by Kant (119). Eventually, writers such
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as Novalis would critique and build on the Fichtean model of the ―self-positing subject (or
ego)‖, as it is also commonly known.
Although Kant attempted to divorce philosophy and art in his treatment of the
concept, for the Romantics, Darstellung eventually came to emphasize poetic or figural
literary expression, which they believed could more effectively close the gap between
representation and presence (i.e., the representation of something and its actual
existence) than philosophy; thus, literary form became a crucial space in which they
could explore and attempt to overcome, or transcend, this problematic.
While many of the Jena Romantics were able to take Kant‘s and Fichte‘s
philosophies as points of departure and expand them to found and support their program
of ―transcendental poetry‖—at least initially—, the writer Heinrich von Kleist expressed
his skepticism toward many of the basic premises upon which these philosophies were
developed. While it remains undetermined which specific text or texts Kleist is referring
to in his letters, the critique is relatively clear and becomes clearer after one encounters
his literary works. From Helfer‘s perspective, Kleist‘s main arguments can be summed up
as follows:
Kleist‘s critique of transcendentalism is three-pronged. First, we cannot decide
whether a priori knowledge or truth really exists. Nor, if truth does exist, can we
determine whether our representation of truth is itself true. Finally, it is possible
that truth itself does not exist and that we mistakenly believe our representation
of truth is truth. […] In other words, Kleist‘s ―Kant crisis‖ is motivated by a
9

representational quandary: the impossibility of knowing what kind of
relationship, if any, exists between truth and appearance, Wahrheit and Schein.
(120)
The skeptical arguments that Kant had unleashed in order to propose a solution
could not be called back once they had entered into Kleist‘s mind. For him, attempting to
find a viable method for achieving ―pure representation‖ was futile because one obstacle
would always obstruct the self‘s ability to determine the nature of an object‘s essence: our
subjective perception and consequent inability to know if what we see has the qualities
we perceive because they are inherent in the object or because they are built into the
framework of our perception process. Kleist‘s best-known epistolary excerpt illustrates
this argument to his fiancée Wilhelmine via a metaphor that employs the image of ―green
lenses‖: ―Wenn alle Menschen statt der Augen grüne Gläser hätten, so würden sie
urteilen müssen, die Gegenstände, welche sie dadurch erblicken, sind grün—und nie
würden sie entscheiden können, ob ihr Auge ihnen die Dinge zeigt, wie sie sind oder ob
nicht etwas zu ihnen hinzutut, was nicht ihnen, sondern dem Auge gehört. So ist es mit
dem Verstande‖ (Sämtliche Werke und Briefe 634). Through this metaphor, Kleist is able
to articulate his sense of a critical discrepancy between the object as it exists in the self‘s
consciousness and the object in itself, or, as Kant referred to it, the ―Ding-an-sich.‖ This
sudden rupture for Kleist seems to be perceived as a loss of the Ding-an-sich itself, and
since the idea of the knowability of the essence of the Ding-an-sich underpins rational
thought, secure knowledge can now no longer exist. By extension, if the goal of
10

Darstellung is to circumvent or transcend anything that stands in the way of presenting
objects or concepts in their totality, then any attempt to do so is defeated already by the
limitations of the self‘s perceptive position. As Tim Mehigan notes in his essay ―‗Betwixt a
false reason and none at all‘: Kleist, Hume, Kant, and the ‗Thing in Itself,‘‖ the self is
―error prone. And errors are clearly that with which the cognitive aspect of reason is
meant to dispense‖ (175).
Furthermore, Kleist‘s concern with the goal of pure representation—whether
representation of objects and concepts to the self or the self to itself—stems from the
problem of the warped spectrality that is involved in the process of representation. For
instance, if we perceive something and produce some sort of representation of it, and
then another person approaches the representation from yet another subjective position
of perception, then an infinite amount of distortion is ultimately possible—perhaps not
merely possible, but even inevitable, since the Ding-an-sich is distorted at the moment in
which it registers in the first person‘s consciousness. Thus, Kleist‘s position does not even
allow for an attempt at pure representation—not due to the inadequacy of the art form,
etc., but because of the limitations of the human cognitive process that creates the form.
As I will later demonstrate, Kleist‘s struggle with the issue of distorted spectrality is
remarkably present in his novellas Die Marquise von O… and Das Erdbeben in Chili
through the kaleidoscope-like blending of perspective that he embeds in the narrative
structure. These works, as well as other works he wrote, are clearly self-reflexive in that
they appear to attempt to undermine the concept of pure representation and, in doing so,
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also call into question the process of reading itself.
The process of reading is an interesting and important trope for the literature
generated during this period and perhaps deserves to be addressed in terms of its potential
relevance for viewing Kleist‘s work as well. Clayton Koelb recently published an entire
book4 that presents a compelling discussion on the idea of the process of reading as an
interpretive tool for coming to an understanding of some of the crucial questions of the
theory of life during the Romantic period. Specifically, he addresses how the Romantics
drew a parallel between the reading process and the question of how ―dead‖ material can
be transformed into something living. He asks, in a manner that immediately evokes
images of Frankenstein‘s monster: ―How can we properly characterize and explain the
mysterious relations between dead material bodies and living, animate beings? What
process causes one to turn into the other […] And, most puzzling of all, is it possible that
life could arise out of lifeless matter?‖ (3). His answer to these questions, however, draws
a perhaps unanticipated parallel: ―The key that could unlock these mysteries lay
surprisingly close at hand: the process by which dead matter could come to life, they
imagined, must be something like the process of reading‖ (3). Koelb addresses the manner
in which art was viewed as a tool with which the fragmentation of the world—for Kleist,
perhaps the fragmentation of meaning through the division of the subject and the world
in which it exists—could be pieced back together, or ―revivified.‖ In the process of
contextualizing his argument, Koelb recalls Johann Georg Hamann‘s characterization of

Clayton Koelb, The Revivifying Word: Literature, Philosophy, and the Theory of Life in Europe‘s Romantic
Age (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2008).
4
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the world as a great poem or book whose pages have been ripped out and scattered and
left for us to decipher. Here again, the problem of the ―limited human perspective‖ is
addressed with regard to its inability to understand the ―language of nature‖; for humans,
that language is ―defunct‖ and needs resuscitation (4). These issues are also pertinent to
Kleist‘s writing, particularly since we know that he grappled with related philosophical
questions.
It is unclear to me whether or not Kleist intended to do so, however, I would
maintain that his works frequently employ the trope—above all, a formal trope in this
case—of the reading process, and this trope eventually serves as a metaphorical
microcosm to illustrate the situation in which we find ourselves when we attempt to
―read‖ or interpret the world. In his rejection of the Idealist and Romantic treatments of
the problem of representation, Kleist appears to have pursued his own experiments in
―transcending‖ the limits of representation despite his dissatisfaction with others‘
attempts, and this approach relies heavily on the interaction of the text and the reader.
His works clearly portray an effort to work through the problem by displacing it into the
realm of the reader-text interface. I will argue that an analysis of his literary approach
with regard to the narrative structure‘s demands on the reader supports the argument
that this quality of his texts ironically renders them, in the end, a perhaps more
appropriate form of Darstellung than he realized was possible. That is, Kleist turns the
problem of false specularity associated with perception and representation (which are
both crucial to the process of interpretation) on its head by forcing the reader to become
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acutely and personally aware of this very problem—not only thematically but also via the
experience of reading the text.

14

CHAPTER ONE
MULTIPERSPECTIVITY, CLOSURE, AND THE WORK OF THE READER
When we read, it is certainly possible to take for granted the process in which we
are participating. Namely, we can easily fall into the assumption that we are in effect
merely handing ourselves over to the author‘s will: we view the words on the page, create
a mental picture of the events portrayed, and become carried along whatever path the
author has set out for us to follow. From this perspective, reading does not necessarily
seem like a ―life-and-death‖ matter; yet, without a reader, the text would not be a
―literary work‖ but, rather, a merely lifeless bound stack of paper containing static words.
It takes a perceiver to make written ideas come to life, to make meaning out of the text, as
Wolfgang Iser notes in his essay ―The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach‖:
―The work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life when it is realized‖ (50).
The realization of the work clearly not only depends on the author‘s creative process as
manifested in the text but also on the work of the reader; accordingly, the character of
the ―realized‖ work forms somewhere in the space between the reader and the text,
however virtual this space may be. Thus, narrative necessarily involves discourse, or a
two-sided construction; in other words, a storyteller must have a listener for his story to
take on meaning. Conversely, it is this ability to engage in such discourse, or
construction, that allows us to make meaning in life and come to conclusions based on
that meaning.
When considering the ubiquity of narration in our lives, there is no question that
15

it can be, and indeed often is, a crucial matter. H. Porter Abbott considers the process of
storytelling even in its broadest sense a kind of narrative, pointing out in The Cambridge

Introduction to Narrative that ―[a]s soon as we follow a subject with a verb, there is a
good chance we are engaged in narrative discourse‖ (1). In A Theory of Narrative, Rick
Altman expounds on the topic further:
Among human endeavors, few are more widely spread or more generally
endowed with cultural importance than narrative—the practice of storytelling.
Not only are stories universally told, stored, and analyzed, but also they regularly
occupy a place of honor in society. Stories constitute the bulk of sacred texts; they
are the major vehicle of personal memory; and they are a mainstay of law,
entertainment, and history. (1)
Thus, we all participate in narration as well as the interpretation of others‘ ―narratives,‖
and we make judgments—indeed, at times ―life-and-death‖ judgments—based on these
interpretations. Ultimately, one could say that we ―read‖ each other and the world in a
manner not entirely dissimilar to the way we read written material, and our roles as
―readers‖ in everyday life are certainly not insignificant. Moreover, not only do we
engage in narrative discourse and interpretation on a quotidian basis, but it indeed
appears as if we were born to do so. For instance, communicating to our parents—
―telling‖ them what we feel, what we want, or what happened to the neighbor‘s fence—is
one of the first skills we learn as children, and we are, in turn, dependent on their ability
to receive and act upon this information in order to survive. Abbott notes as well that it is
16

not merely a survival technique that drives narration, but our propensity to narrate and
interpret can also be linked to our inquisitive nature as humans, in that we ―are made in
such a way that we continually look for the causes of things,‖ and ―[n]arrative by its
arrangement of events gratifies our need for order‖ (41–42). Furthermore, he asserts with
little reservation that ―[g]iven the presence of narrative in almost all human discourse,
there is little wonder that there are theorists who place it next to language itself as the
distinctive human trait‖ (1). For many theorists, narration is seen as a kind of coping
mechanism for humans‘ unique ―gift‖ of consciousness—above all employed for the
understanding and organization of time.
Our ―temporal existence‖ and the need to come to terms with it brings up another
area in which narrative plays a large role—namely, the realm of spirituality, which
Altman implies above when referring to sacred texts. Over thousands of years, narrative
has served a spiritual role in helping humans come to terms with the fundamental
metaphysical questions of the universe insofar as the narrative discourse initiated by
spiritual texts can help negotiate the ―gaps‖ posed by the unsolved mysteries of the world.
One of these timelessly troubling unknown realms is the boundary between life and
death, an enigma that carries with it the question of how the realms of the living and the
dead are related to one another and to what extent they can ―interact.‖ In The

Revivifying Word, Koelb addresses the European Romantic response to such issues by
expanding on the idea of the ―reading process‖ as a metaphor for the possibility of
revivifying dead matter, which fascinated the Romantics both thematically—given the
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discussions about the theory of life in natural philosophy at the time—and as an aesthetic
model to incorporate into their literary program. Koelb traces this idea back to a key
Biblical notion proposed by the apostle Paul to the Corinthians regarding the validity of
Biblical scripture when he attempted to emphasize these written (and thus ―dead‖)
documents‘ potential to be as significant as ―live,‖ spoken discourse, which was held in
higher esteem by the Greeks than the written word. In order to convince them of the
scriptures‘ authority, he ―[undermines] the authority of the bare text‖ and emphasizes its
power when accompanied by the presence of the divine spirit that God has promised
with the new covenant. Koelb paraphrases Paul‘s position: ―Documents can be a form of
living, breathing discourse, but only if their dead letters are animated by the living spirit‖
(7).
Although the potential for the ―dead letter‖ to ―come to life‖ via a divine spirit
was not necessarily an important concept for the Romantics in terms of spiritual
significance, Koelb argues that the idea of a living spirit animating a dead text provided a
fruitful template for them to investigate some of the major questions being examined in
the natural sciences with regard to life and death and to come up with an aesthetic
approach that would be appropriate for dealing with these questions:
[Paul‘s] proposition provided the philosophical foundation for an aesthetic theory,
and that theory in turn implied a remarkably productive narrative idea. The
aesthetic theory focused attention on the mysterious process by which lifeless
material objects mediate an interaction between the living minds of artists and
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their audiences. The narrative application was a set of literary texts in which
characters cross the boundary between death and life with the help of some form
of reading. Romantic aesthetics thus provided not only the theory but also the
principal theme for a persistent genre of Romantic fiction. In both theory and
practice, then, Romanticism was frequently a matter of life and death. (ix)
In analyzing the literary work of Heinrich von Kleist, this model is important to
keep in mind, because Kleist certainly would have been at least indirectly exposed to—if
not explicitly aware of—its significance for the aesthetic theory behind much of the
literary writing published by his contemporaries. Indeed, the character of Kleist‘s
narrative approach, particularly that of his novellas, indicates an acute awareness of the
role of the reader in the realization—or in Koelb‘s terms, ―vivification‖—of his stories.
Additionally, the whole notion of the process of reading as a guiding metaphor for
illuminating the process by which we come to uncover (or come to terms with) the
―poem‖ of the world that is presented to us in a seemingly riddled language is not merely
relevant when examining Kleist‘s works but, I would argue, crucial. Given Kleist‘s
grappling with the discrepancies between rational Enlightenment thought and the
―unknowability‖ of the world as presented by Kantian epistemology, it is entirely
appropriate that Kleist would attempt to explore these contradictions through the textreader interface in literature. Indeed, a literary work and the role of the reader in relation
to it can very aptly serve as a microcosm for our desire to make meaning of a universe
that often, and at times seemingly intentionally, prevents us from doing so. Furthermore,
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Kleist‘s texts both structurally and thematically appear to extend this metaphor to an
almost exaggerated degree by complicating the reader‘s task in such a manner that he5 is
forced to become conscious of the ultimate impossibility of reaching absolute conclusions
regarding what is ―actually‖ occurring in the narrative world. Both the mechanics and
thematics of this strategy will be investigated at different points in this paper; however, I
would first like to return briefly to an idea that Iser and many other important founding
thinkers for reader-response theory have emphasized, and that is the reader‘s role in what
Iser refers to as the Konkretisation (realization) of the text.
Of course, the idea that the realization of a literary text involves and in fact

requires work on the part of the reader is not by any means a new concept in the world
of literature. Reading always involves attention to nuance and imaginative effort, and
only through this attention and effort does the text come to life. Iser even claims that
―good‖ literature must challenge the reader by leaving a significant amount of
―unwritten‖ information in a text so that he resorts to using his own creative faculties to
fill in the gaps. To demonstrate that this idea is nothing novel, he cites the following
passage from Lawrence Sterne‘s Life and Opinions of Tristam Shandy, Gentleman (1759–
1769), which touches on the same topic:
No author who understands the just boundaries of decorum and good breeding
would presume to think all. The truest respect which you can pay the reader‘s

I will use the pronoun ―he‖ to refer to the reader rather than ―she‖ or ―s/he,‖ both for the sake of clarity
and, as I will later discuss, because Kleist‘s works tend to force a more dominating, ―male‖ manner of reading
on the reader (see: Chapter Three).
5
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understanding is to halve this matter amicably and leave him something to
imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself. For my own part, I am eternally paying
him compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power to keep his
imagination as busy as my own. (51)
Iser sums up Sterne‘s understanding of a literary text as ―something like an arena in
which reader and author participate in a game of imagination‖ and uses this notion to
support his argument that the reader must be left some parts of the story to work out on
his own—at the very least, in order to prevent boredom (51). For Iser, reading can only
involve pleasure when active creativity is involved on the part of the reader; for instance,
if it conforms completely to the expectations it arouses earlier in the text, it will leave the
reader to simply ―accept or reject the thesis forced upon [him]‖ rather than provoking
him to reflect or realize the complexity of an issue or situation (53). However, he does
admit that the reader may well opt to ―leave the game‖ when overexerted as well, and the
author should therefore avoid both extremes.
Around the same time in the mid-1970s, Roland Barthes addressed similar
narratological questions in his work The Pleasure of the Text (1973) but arrived at
slightly different conclusions regarding the manner in which texts should engage their
readers. Barthes, contrary to Iser, does identify a kind of pleasure (plaisir) elicited by
those sorts of texts that leave less work for the reader to complete and simply lure them
along until the end like a ―corporeal striptease‖ (10). He associates this ―pleasure‖ with
texts that uphold the cultural status quo and allow for a ―comfortable practice of reading‖
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(14). However, comfort is not Barthes‘s ideal: for him, the ultimate fulfillment goes
beyond mere pleasure and reaches jouissance, or bliss. In order for a text to achieve this
feat, the author must resist the temptation to content the reader and conform to his
expectations; the ―text of bliss‖ is thus ―the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that
discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader‘s historical,
cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings
to a crisis his relation with language‖ (14). In Barthes‘s previous work, S/Z (1970), he had
discussed these notions in terms of the quality of texts that correspond to ―pleasure‖ and
―bliss,‖ calling them lisible (―readerly‖) and scriptible (―writerly‖). Namely, a readerly text
encourages passive consumption and demonstrates the author‘s power over the reader,
while a writerly text encourages active participation on the part of the reader—that the
reader to a certain extent constructs, or ―writes‖ the story himself. While Barthes‘s
distinctions vary to some extent from Iser‘s, he ultimately takes more or less the same
position, albeit with a perhaps more explicit ideological agenda: ―Why is the writerly our
value? Because the goal of literary work […] is to make the reader no longer a consumer,
but a producer of the text. Our literature is characterized by the pitiless divorce which
the literary institution maintains between the producer of the text and its user, between
its owner and its customer, between its author and its reader‖ (S/Z 1).
The degree to which a text can be considered ―writerly‖ is, admittedly, a
distinction that in and of itself is dynamic and unstable and thus problematic as well; for
these reasons, among others, Barthes has been criticized for taking a more ―Romantic
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approach‖ to critical theory insofar as he allows his critical writing to be more
experimental, open, and, in a sense, more productive than descriptive (for some, it
represents more a form of ―creative‖ criticism than critical theory).6 However, examining
Kleist‘s work in light of a more ―Romantic‖ critical angle may indeed prove to be fruitful
because of the Romantic milieu out of which it arose. Furthermore, the consequent
―unpresentability‖ of the concept of ―writerliness‖ perhaps derives its justification for
being so from some of the same unanswerable questions regarding interpretation that
Kleist‘s narrative techniques bring to the fore. Hence, although a text‘s degree of
―writerliness‖ cannot be exactly measured or pinpointed, reflecting on the idea of it in
relation to a text can help illuminate some of that text‘s unique qualities that may
otherwise be difficult to describe. Moreover, since the power of Kleist‘s texts rely heavily
on the position of the reader‘s interpretation at any given point in the narrative discourse,
it seems only appropriate to examine them with the aid of a concept that underlines the
significance of the reader‘s role by privileging the writerly over the readerly.
Not only can Kleist‘s texts merely be associated with the writerly, but they are in
fact notorious for seeming to intentionally problematize the possibility of interpretation.
The manner in which they endeavor to do so and why can be examined from numerous
different angles; however, because I will primarily be dealing with the novellas Die

Marquise von O… and Das Erdbeben in Chili, I will be addressing two key narrative
strategies that make this problematization possible throughout these two works.

6

See: Niall Lucy, Postmodern Literary Theory (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997) 75–76.
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Plurality in Perspective
The first strategy that Kleist‘s texts tend to employ is directly linked to an issue
that necessarily arises from the general readerly-writerly debate in its various
articulations. From the viewpoints of Iser and Barthes, one important observation appears
to be that ―worthy‖ or ―bliss-inducing‖ literary texts force the reader to encounter
something unexpected or unfamiliar—possibly even uncomfortable—, and these kinds of
texts invite the reader to recognize within them a certain degree of dynamism or
potential interpretive plurality. In this way, possibly unanticipated and perhaps even
conflicting responses are awakened in the reader. Iser notes the dynamism of
interpretation during the reading process even as the reader moves from one sentence to
the next, since each addition of information causes him continually to renegotiate the
meaning and eventual direction of the text: ―the activity of reading can be characterized
as a sort of kaleidoscope of perspectives, preintentions, recollections‖ (54). ―Perspective‖
is a key word here, and the idea of the existence of multiple perspectives that can arise
within the same reader can also be extended to the potential plurality of perspective with
respect to the ―verity‖ of a central story event that manifests itself often as a contradiction
of viewpoints from different characters in the story. The two Kleistian novellas that I will
examine operate to a great degree by forcing the reader to face a kind of despair that
accompanies the realization that multiple accounts of a story from different perspectives
often cannot be reconciled in any satisfying way for a reader seeking clarity and unity.
Indeed, it was largely the problem of perspective—specifically, the subjectivity of
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knowledge—in Kantian epistemology that troubled Kleist, and in this way, it is
appropriate that the issue would surface in various forms through the content and
structure of his narratives.
This problem will be addressed principally, but not exclusively, through an
investigation of the narratological notion of focalization as it contrasts with narration.
Both Gérard Genette and Mieke Bal are credited with the development of this concept. In

Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (1980), Genette addresses a critical difference
between the narrator and the eyes through which the story is told, claiming that in
traditional narrative theory, there had been a ―confusion between the question who is the

character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective? and the very different
question who is the narrator—or, more simply, the question who sees? and the question

who speaks?‖ (186). In Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (1980), Bal
expands on Genette‘s observations by emphasizing that the word ―perspective,‖ when
used in relation to narrative, can be deceiving, as it causes us to forget that there is a
difference between the narrative perspective—or type of narrator telling the story (for
instance, a third person omniscient narrator)—and the actual vision through which this
narration is filtered:
Focalization is the relationship between the ―vision,‖ the agent that sees, and that
which is seen. This relationship is a component of the story part, of the content of
the narrative text: A says that B sees what C is doing. […] Consequently,
focalization belongs in the story, the layer in between the linguistic text and the
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fabula. […] The reader watches with the [focalizing] character‘s eyes and will, in
principle, be inclined to accept the vision presented by that character. (104)
Bal thus makes a similar argument for the importance of analyzing separately those in the
narrative who see and those who speak; however, she also finds Genette‘s model deficient
insofar as it treats narrators and focalizors7 as completely separate entities, even though
extradiegetic focalization can also exist—in which case the (third-person) narrator and
the focalizor would be one and the same entity. She therefore revises Genette‘s model by
creating a further distinction between internal (character-driven) and external (narratordriven) focalization (101).
We will see that Kleist‘s narratives tend to shift discreetly between focalizors and,
in doing so, create tensions in the story that are difficult to come to terms with if the
reader is not aware of the narrator‘s ability to ―zoom‖ in and out of the story world
through the eyes of different characters whose perspectives are not always perfectly
aligned. Furthermore, as Bal points out, the reader tends to accept the ―vision‖ of
whatever focalizor is employed at any given moment in the narrative; however, when a
contradicting ―vision‖ is presented, the reader must reconsider his initial trust in the
narrative, and this can lead to the suspicion of an unreliable narrator and a consequent
destabilization of the text. In turn, the reader is forced to reevaluate the entirety of the
narrative as presented, and this quality of the text—the fact that the reader is not

In critical writing, the spelling of this word varies: Genette‘s translator used ―focalizer,‖ and Bal‘s translator
used ―focalizor.‖ In this paper, I will use the spelling ―focalizor,‖ because I primarily draw from Bal‘s
distinctions and also because the ―-or‖ agent-ending correlates with the term ―narrator.‖
7
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permitted to sit back and passively absorb the story—seems to render it ―writerly‖ in the
sense that Barthes and Iser identified and promoted. Additionally, all of these problems of
perspective underline the texts‘ dynamism and contribute to the complication of closure
for the reader, which is the second important narrative strategy that I address.
The Contradiction of Closure
The different signs or signals embedded in the text that cause the reader to make
the interpretive decisions that he does are referred to by Barthes as ―codes,‖ and he
outlines five of these codes in S/Z. According to Abbott, what makes these qualities
―codes‖ is ―that author and reader share [them] in order to make a narrative readable‖
(57). Two such codes that I consider the most pertinent to an analysis of Kleist‘s work are
addressed and expanded on by Abbott in a chapter on narrative closure: the ―proairetic
code,‖ which applies to expectations and actions, and the ―hermeneutic code,‖ which
applies to questions and answers. The identification of these two codes, or ―levels,‖ as
Abbott prefers to call them, can serve as a particularly helpful tool when taking a critical
approach to the two Kleistian novellas that I examine here, as both works—as well as
most other works by Kleist—present a distinct problematization of narrative closure.
Since the degree of the reader‘s satisfaction and/or frustration at the ―level of
expectations‖ and the ―level of questions,‖ as Abbott refers to them, is directly linked to
the possibility of closure in the narrative, an investigation of the text-reader interface at
these levels in the two Kleist works chosen for this study serves as an appropriate means
by which we can examine the author‘s second important narrative strategy—namely, his
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tendency to exploit the reader‘s desire for closure.
Abbott aptly points out that, in order for closure to be necessary in a narrative,
there must first be a conflict of some sort that needs to be resolved. Indeed, Kleist‘s
novellas do often revolve around a central situation or conflict that is mysterious or
bizarre in that it appears to be highly unlikely but nonetheless has occurred; this very
sense of contradiction often comprises the conflict—for instance, the troubled Marquise
in Die Marquise8 who finds herself pregnant without (knowingly) having copulated or
the devastating earthquake in Das Erdbeben that occurs just in time to free an adulterous
woman who is about to be executed and her lover who is about to hang himself. The
resolution of such conflicts requires, at least for the characters in the story, a
reinterpretation of the universe as they know it, and they therefore find themselves
asking, ―Can this be possible? What does this mean?‖ We, too, as readers find ourselves
caught up in the characters‘ confusion and questioning, and we tend to expect that
answers will eventually be provided. Yet, as Abbott notes, ―[t]he term ‗closure‘ can refer
to more than the resolution of a story‘s central conflict. It has to do with a broad range of
expectations and uncertainties that arise during the course of a narrative and that part of
us, at least, hopes to resolve, or close‖ (57). Suspended closure—or ―suspense,‖ as it is
commonly termed—gives the narrative its vigor and explains partially why we return to
narrative as a form of entertainment. Barthes‘s system of narrative ―codes‖ suggests that,
at the level of expectations, the author can arouse in readers certain expectations of how

I will henceforth refer to Die Marquise von O… as Die Marquise and Das Erdbeben in Chili as Das
Erdbeben for the sake of brevity.
8
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the plot will proceed through actions and events (e.g., crime committed leads to
punishment), and for the sake of suspense, the author will often delay the fulfillment of
those expectations. At the level of questions, a certain amount of clarification is expected
by the reader with regard to information that has been withheld or does not quite seem
to ―add up‖ throughout the story. Again, the author will often delay or intentionally
mislead the reader until he is allowed ―enlightenment‖ of the facts at the end. However,
it may also so happen in the end that these expectations and questions are not fulfilled
but, rather, frustrated through the absence of closure. The latter is clearly the case in
Kleist‘s works.
What makes Kleist‘s narratives so interesting and at the same time problematic,
however, is not the fact that they often contain an absence of closure—this is a fairly
common literary technique by now and thus nothing new. The aspect of his narratives
that has attracted readers and critics for nearly 200 years is the fact that they seem to
provide the terms for closure but resist and revoke it at the same time through suspicious
details and nuances in the text as well as gaps where crucial information might otherwise
be provided. This technique plays on our need as readers to know and arrive at some sort
of conclusion: ―[T]he promise of closure has great rhetorical power in narrative. Closure
brings satisfaction to desire, relief to suspense, and clarity to confusion. It normalizes. It
confirms the masterplot‖ (Abbott 64). The result is the feeling of disillusionment that
accompanies an unfulfilled promise, which then evokes in the reader a sense of chaos and
disorder that permeates the narrative world. Once it becomes clear to the reader that
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closure does not seem to be on Kleist‘s agenda, the reader becomes more aware of his
ultimate inability to make a sound interpretation of what is occurring. As Amanda
Norton remarks in her article ―Another Meditation on Das Erdbeben in Chili: Heinrich
von Kleist and the Work of the Reader,‖ it occurs frequently in Kleist‘s works that the
text ―seems to be taunting the reader about the myriad things he [the reader] does not
know or cannot fully understand‖ (137). In Barthes‘s terms, Kleist seems to be using codes
to trigger certain expectations in the reader and then ultimately betrays these
expectations by breaking the ―promise‖ to which the use of the code pretended to
commit.
Overreading and Underreading
The two strategies Kleist employs by unleashing perspectival plurality through
focalization and resisting closure through gaps and contradiction create tension between
the actual ―story world‖—or diegetic reality—and the narrative through which events are
communicated to the reader. These textual ―problems‖ lead the reader to reconcile the
paradoxical or incomplete elements on his own. Narratives do inherently contain gaps
and tensions, and in order to overcome these ―obstacles,‖ a reader will typically
compensate by doing one of two things. If there are gaps, he will often make an
assumption based on cues and read into the story something that is not there and has no
direct evidence—this is called ―overreading.‖9 In the face of contradiction and paradox,

The invention of the terms ―overreading‖ and ―underreading‖ can be attributed to British literary critic
Frank Kermode in his work The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (1979).
9
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however, the reader might ―underread‖—that is, disregard or gloss over (consciously or
unconsciously) something that does exist in the narrative—in order to establish or restore
cohesion and order. Readers engage in overreading and underreading, for one, to avoid
being suspended in a state of uncertainty, as this state is very difficult to maintain.
Furthermore, as Abbott points out, both underreading and overreading might also stem
from a necessity to take action, and ―in order to act, we need to know (or at least think
we know) what the story is. Our survival as a species has probably depended on our doing
this with sufficient speed and efficiency to get done what we need to get done in order
simply to stay alive‖ (88).
It is in fact exactly this human tendency—to jump to conclusions—that Kleist
often thematizes in his texts. Namely, we as humans, in our ―reading‖ of the world also
underread and overread by taking cues from established thought patterns or social norms.
However, often, when we presume we ―know,‖ we are merely making assumptions, and
these assumptions can have dire consequences—for instance, if these assumptions play a
role in deciding the fate of another person. This brings us back to the notion of reading as
a matter of ―life and death.‖ The goal of the textual analysis that follows is to examine
how Kleist‘s texts exploit the reader‘s desire to know and to find closure and, in turn, how
the texts‘ effects on the reader seek to demonstrate to him how tricky and problematic
the task of interpretation can be.
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CHAPTER TWO
A NARRATOLOGY/READER-RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF DIE MARQUISE VON O…
AND DAS ERDBEBEN IN CHILI

Die Marquise von O…10
One of Kleist‘s most frequently read and analyzed novellas is Die Marquise von

O…, which he published in Phöbus11 in 1808 and likely worked on while he was
imprisoned in France in 1807.12 The novella‘s plot, which in many respects takes on the
form of a ―whodunit‖ mystery, revolves around a puzzling and troubling situation in
which a widowed Italian marquise finds herself. When the citadel guarded by the
Marquise‘s father, General G…, is stormed one night by Russian troops, the Marquise
tries to escape and suddenly becomes cornered by a group of enemy sharpshooters who
capture her and attempt to rape her. At the crucial moment, a Russian officer, Count F…,
breaks in, fends off the assaulters, and then leads her away from combat and the ensuing
fires into a safe building, where she faints and shortly thereafter is reunited with her
family and servants. After she recovers, she wants to thank the Count in person for his
remarkable deed; however, he allegedly is fatally wounded before she gets the chance to
Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche Erzählungen und Anekdoten, 3rd ed., ed. Hannelore Schlaffer (Munich:
Wilhelm Goldmann, 1995) 107–47. All of my quotes, unless otherwise indicated, will be taken from this
edition.
11 Many of Kleist‘s most famous works were originally published in Phöbus: ein Journal für die Kunst. The
periodical was a monthly literary journal edited by Kleist and Adam Heinrich Müller in Dresden from
January 1808 to December 1808. Kleist and Müller could not agree on the direction of the publication, and it
eventually proved to be a money-losing venture for both editors; it was therefore discontinued less than a
year after its inception.
12 David Luke and Nigel Reeves, trans., ―Introduction,‖ The Marquise of O— and Other Stories by Heinrich
von Kleist (London: Penguin, 2004) 15. Kleist was accused of espionage in January of 1807, when Berlin was
occupied by Napoleonic troops, and subsequently imprisoned in France at Chalons-sur-Marne. He was
released in July 1807 and founded Phöbus the following year (see: Fischer 5).
10
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do so. Some time later, the Marquise—described at the outset as ―eine Dame von
vortrefflichem Ruf‖ (107)—begins to experience sensations that remind her of her second
pregnancy and is puzzled by them because she would have no reason to be pregnant.
However, after confiding in her mother and joking with her about the impossibility of
such an occurrence, the Marquise soon feels normal again and forgets the whole matter.
Not long after this incident, the Count—who was assumed to be dead but is alive
after all—appears at the family‘s door and engages in some very mysterious behavior.
Namely, he proposes to the Marquise and, despite their lack of acquaintance with one
another, expresses his desperate wish to marry her as soon as possible, since he has
received orders to carry out military duties in Naples and must depart immediately. He
never reveals the exact reasons for his strange sense of urgency but supports his great
passion for the Marquise and his unhesitating desire to marry her by the fact that her
presence was somehow with him during crucial moments of recovery from his near-fatal
battle wounds. The Marquise and her family, however, do not feel comfortable with such
a hasty decision and therefore tell him that he must wait for her answer until he returns
from Naples. The Count seems troubled by the failure of his proposition but agrees to the
terms, leaves, and promises to return as soon as he feasibly can.
A few weeks later, the Marquise‘s bizarre sensations return—―mit größerer
Lebhaftigkeit‖—and she notices undeniable changes in her body (123). Although she
apparently has no knowledge as to how conception could have occurred, her suspicions13

Although it seems contradictory that the Marquise would at all entertain suspicions of being pregnant if
she had not knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse, I have deliberately chosen this phrasing because it
13
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are confirmed by both a doctor and a midwife: she is unquestionably pregnant. She
swears her innocence but is nonetheless banished by her family and left to live a life in
isolation with her children at her former estate. Eventually, she decides to place an
advertisement in the local newspaper that urges the father of the child in her womb to
come forth and admit his offense so that she can marry him and save her family‘s
reputation. The Marquise‘s mother, meanwhile, puts her conscience to a test and
ascertains that she is, in fact, telling the truth and did not knowingly engage in the sexual
act that caused her pregnancy. In the end, it is the Count who walks in at the arranged
day and time to reveal his identity as the father of her child and take her hand in
marriage. The Marquise very reluctantly, if not unwillingly, marries him but gradually
finds herself increasingly happier with the arrangement; a year later, the Count proposes
a second time, and they celebrate a second wedding, this time ―froher als die erste‖ (147).
The ending is not tragic after all, and they have many children and live more or less
happily ever after.
Closure
As is apparent even in this abbreviated version of the plot, the narrative is riddled
with a great deal of confusion, primarily due to withheld and/or seemingly paradoxical
information. Furthermore, those explanations that are provided often leave the reader
seeking further clarification and feeling, at times, even more puzzled than he was before.

underlines the dilemma of her paradoxical situation: her body is telling her one thing—that she is
pregnant—and her understanding of the world causes her to believe another—that pregnancy is not
possible.
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In this sense, possibly the most interesting and curious ―figure‖ in Kleist‘s stories is the
narrator himself. The narrator of Die Marquise purports simply to be recounting the
details of a real-life event, which is indicated from the outset in the novella‘s subtitle:
„Nach einer wahren Begebenheit, deren Schauplatz vom Norden nach dem Süden verlegt
worden‖ (107). However, in a similar fashion to the opening sentence from Michael

Kohlhaas,14 the reader is immediately presented with a character that possesses starkly
contrasting, if not paradoxical, qualities:
In M..., einer bedeutenden Stadt im oberen Italien, ließ die verwitwete
Marquise von O..., eine Dame von vortrefflichem Ruf, und Mutter von
mehreren wohlerzogenen Kindern, durch die Zeitungen bekannt machen: daß sie,
ohne ihr Wissen, in andre Umstände gekommen sei, daß der Vater zu dem Kinde,
das sie gebären würde, sich melden solle; und daß sie, aus Familienrücksichten,
entschlossen wäre, ihn zu heiraten. (105)
Just as Michael Kohlhaas was supposedly one of the ―most honorable‖ and,
simultaneously, the ―most terrible‖ of his age, the Marquise happens to have both an
―unblemished reputation‖ and an unexplainable pregnancy. Thus, from the first sentence,
the narrator appears to be pulling the reader in two opposite directions with contrasting
proairetic, or expectational, codes—and this trend toward paradox only increases
throughout the development of the story. More specifically, the narrator is complicating
Michael Kohlhaas is the eponymous protagonist of Kleist‘s 1806 novella Michael Kohlhaas. The opening
line reads: ―An den Ufern der Havel lebte, um die Mitte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, ein Roßhändler,
namens Michael Kohlhaas, Sohn eines Schulmeisters, einer der rechtschaffensten zugleich und
entsetzlichsten Menschen seiner Zeit‖ (Schlaffer 9).
14
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the reader‘s desire to recognize and establish a sense of character consistency by pairing
characters with potential actions that do not at all correspond to their otherwise
remarkably stable personalities.
It is never clear when or how the Marquise is raped—if she was indeed raped—or
even that the Count definitively was the culprit, as he never actually comes out with a
direct confession. Traditionally, readers and critics have overcome the absence of closure
due to a lacking rape scene by interpreting a dash in the text that appears during the
storming of the citadel to signify this ―unspeakable‖ event; the dash is initially quite
inconspicuous and thus easily overread; in retrospect, however, it seems to emerge as a
significant marker after all, since it appears to be the only space in the narrative that
could house a potential rape act. After this possibility is considered, it does seem a bit too
syntactically awkward to be dismissed as mere punctuation. The dash is granted further
validity for this role by the fact that it is imbedded in the text between the Marquise‘s
sudden unconsciousness and the arrival of her servants and family—which means that if
the dash allows for or marks an elapsing of some time, the Count certainly would have
had the opportunity to take advantage of her; yet, as in the case of the Marquise herself,
this possibility seems entirely inconsistent with the Count‘s character as presented thus
far (as well as in subsequent passages):
Der Marquise schien er ein Engel des Himmels zu sein. Er stieß noch dem letzten
viehischen Mordknecht, der ihren schlanken Leib umfaßt hielt, mit dem Griff des
Degens ins Gesicht, daß er, mit aus dem Mund vorquellendem Blut,
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zurücktaumelte; bot dann der Dame, unter einer verbindlichen, französischen
Anrede den Arm, und führte sie, die von allen solchen Auftritten sprachlos war,
in den anderen, von der Flamme noch nicht ergriffenen, Flügel des Palastes, wo
sie auch völlig bewußtlos niedersank. Hier—traf er, da bald darauf ihre
erschrockenen Frauen erschienen, Anstalten, einen Arzt zu rufen; versicherte,
indem er sich den Hut aufsetzte, daß sie sich bald erholen würde; und kehrete in
den Kampf zurück. (108–09)
Why is the Count himself presented as ―ein Engel des Himmels‖ in this passage and
repeatedly referred to by her family as a man ―wie ein junger Gott‖ and with ―so vielen
vortrefflichen Eigenschaften‖ if he indeed was disreputable enough to rape her (113,
121)? Curiously, it is precisely this predicament we find ourselves in as readers: even
though the Count virtually comes out and says, ―It was me, I did it,‖ and seems content to
allow everyone to think so, we tend not to want to believe it. That is, it is almost
impossible for the reader (or any of the characters in the story, for that matter) to imagine
this valiant figure as a rapist. Even in the end, when he enters Colonel G…‘s home to
(ostensibly) rectify his misdeed, the reader is left wondering, like the Marquise and her
mother, how on earth this noble man possibly could be both so chivalrous and so base at
the same time. Moreover, the fact that he never openly admits or explains his actions
compounds the reader‘s sense of hesitancy to accept him as the ―bad guy.‖ The reader is
thus forced to wonder if something else is going on—if, for instance, some telling secret
in the diegetic world is being held back by the narrator on the extradiegetic level. Given
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the Count‘s excellent reputation, the reader is, for instance, almost tempted to ―expect‖ or
assume that he is taking the blame and marrying the Marquise for a more noble cause—
perhaps to conceal knowledge about someone else‘s actions whose implications might be
more damaging—and that the ―real story‖ will be revealed in the end. However, the
narrator offers no such clarification.
Thus, despite the initial, superficial sense of closure presented by the ―happy
ending,‖ as well as the opportunity for further closure via the existence of a convenient
dash, several important interpretive problems remain on both the level of expectations
and the level of questions due to other contradictions and gaps in the text that cannot be
easily reconciled. For example, even if the reader decides that the Count is in fact the
rapist, it is impossible for him to ignore some other ―leads‖ he may have followed earlier
in the story, because details that cause the reader, at least momentarily, to entertain other
suspicions also exist in the narrative. The greatest supporting evidence for rejecting the
―Count as rapist‖ interpretation as the true and complete story is a borderline incestuous
scene between the Marquise and her father when he is finally convinced of her
innocence and the two of them are left alone to be reunited. In this passage, the
Marquise‘s mother stands outside the door and listens to them whispering and then peeps
through the keyhole, which enables her to see, to her heart‘s great joy (!), that the
Marquise is sitting on her father‘s lap. The Colonel‘s wife then inconspicuously slips into
the room and witnesses her daughter leaning back in her husband‘s arms as he gives her
―heiße und lechzende Küsse […] auf ihren Mund‖ (142). The mother‘s approving reaction
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makes it difficult to interpret this otherwise quite explicitly erotic scene, and the
resulting ambiguity is amplified by her final observation that her husband is kissing the
Marquise ―gerade wie ein Verliebter! Die Tochter sprach nicht, er sprach nicht; mit über
sie gebeugtem Antlitz saß er, wie über das Mädchen seiner ersten Liebe, und legte ihr
den Mund zurecht, und küßte sie. Die Mutter fühlte sich, wie eine Selige [...]‖ (142).
This bizarre scene has two functions: first, it disturbs the reader‘s task on the level
of expectations by portraying the allegedly chaste Marquise as a non-objecting (and
perhaps even active) participant in a highly sexualized encounter with her father. When
suddenly seeing her in this light, the reader must seriously reexamine his assumptions
about her character and entertain the possibility of a non-rape case. Secondly, the scene
presents incest as a viable answer for the question at hand—that is, her father as the
father of her child—, and this possibility leads to the reexamination of the father‘s
behavior in other parts of the story. For instance, did his display of the ―utmost
consternation‖ upon learning of his daughter‘s assault (―[er geriet] in die äußerste
Bestürzung,‖ 109) arise merely out of paternal love and protection, or is the superlative
employed here to call attention to other emotions? We also see other potential cues in the
Marquise‘s reactions. For instance, after the doctor has been called and determines that
she is pregnant, she wants to believe that he is playing a cruel joke on her, and her
mother says that her father should be informed. The Marquise seems to be at her wit‘s
end with this thought: ―—O Gott! Sagte die Marquise, mit einer konvulsivischen
Bewegung: wie kann ich mich beruhigen― (124). Her father, when learning of her
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condition, is so upset that he seizes a pistol as she is throwing herself at his feet, and a
shot goes off, at which point the Marquise turns pale and exclaims, ―Herr meines Lebens!‖
and runs out the door. This exclamation is translated into English by David Luke and
Nigel Reeves as ―God preserve me!‖ but literally means ―Lord of my life!‖ in German and
could therefore cause some uncertainty with regard to whom she is addressing here: is it
a mere exclamation or is she admitting that her father is the ―lord of her life‖ through a
secret incestuous affair? While the exclamation on its own is not sexually charged, the
reader must later scrutinize such details after witnessing the reconciliation scene.
Furthermore, when the mother later determines that their daughter is not lying
after all and is able to convince the father of her innocence as well, threatening to leave
him if he does not personally apologize for his outrageous behavior toward the Marquise,
he completely breaks down and is crying and sobbing so violently that even the Marquise
disapproves of her mother‘s harshness and feels the need to comfort her father. Here, the
word ―konvulsivisch‖ reappears to describe the father‘s state, which makes the attentive
reader wonder if the narrator is deliberately linking daughter and father by using such a
conspicuously distinct adjective. Does the convulsiveness, perhaps, mark a realization of
repressed guilt or other emotions? On the other hand, what ―normal‖ mother would
condone relations between her daughter and husband?
While these allegations may seem exaggerated, the lack of closure provided by the
narrator necessarily forces the reader to ponder other scenarios that require some
imagination, and other strange ambiguities and coincidences do allow for a certain
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amount of free play on the part of the reader, however anticipated and directed that ―free
play‖ may be. For example, another potential suspect in the Marquise‘s rape is Leopardo,
the coachman15 from Tirol that the Marquise‘s father had recently hired. The strategy
mentioned above by which the mother tests the Marquise‘s conscience is to tell her that
Leopardo has confessed to being the culprit (even though this is not the case) and that she
must now marry him. The Marquise believes her mother and desperately tries to recall a
time at which this would have been possible: ―Wie? Wo? Wann? Fragte die Marquise
verwirrt.― Then she thinks aloud, ―[i]ch war einst in der Mittagshitze eingeschlummert,
und sah ihn von meinem Diwan gehen, als ich erwachte! Und damit legte sie ihre kleinen
Hände vor ihr in Scham erglühendes Gesicht‖ (139). At this instant, the mother knows
her daughter is innocent and truly seeks to be enlightened about the facts behind her
circumstances as much as everyone else. And although the reader is aware that this is
merely a test, when considering the description of Leopardo‘s broad shoulders, the fact
that he is always referred to as ―Leopardo der Jäger‖ as if he were on the hunt for
something, and the way the Marquise blushes when she looks at him on the ride home—
it is also hard to resist the temptation to wonder whether he might have had something
to do with her pregnancy. This uncertainty is amplified when Leopardo enters the room
at 11 o‘clock on Sunday, when the real father is scheduled to appear; but, of course, he is
a household servant after all and has come only in order to announce the arrival of the
Count.
Kleist actually uses the word Jäger, which has been translated as ―chasseur‖ (Greenberg [1960]),
―coachman‖ (Constantine [2004]), and by Luke and Reeves (1978/2004) as ―groom,‖ which adds an additional
pun to the story.
15
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Still, in the end, it is the most difficult task to explain and come to terms with the
Count‘s frantic behavior and eventual return to the Marquise ―despite‖ her scandalous
pregnancy if one of these other options is true. This illustrates how Kleist consciously
confounds the ―hermeneutic codes‖ between the author/narrator and the reader, thereby
causing tensions on the level of questions and answers that preclude narrative closure. On
one hand, the text effects closure by attempting to ―solve‖ the central conflict with a
marriage and then a second even happier marriage, as if to expel any further doubt;
through its often seemingly objective, journalistic tone and ―mystery story‖ format, it also
frequently leads the reader to believe that an ―answer‖ can in fact be found in the text. In
the end, however, many disparate threads of the story cannot be woven together and are
left for the reader to wrestle with.
Perspectival Plurality
The reader is thus challenged to examine the text from different angles and
entertain multiple interpretive ―tracks‖ or perspectives, experiencing firsthand its
interpretive plurality and its inherent paradoxical quality due to this plurality. The
instability that results when the details in the story no longer ―stack up‖ and begin to
collapse on one another can also be attributed to the contrasting perspectives of the
individual characters, even though the story is relayed by a ―detached‖ third-person
narrator. An investigation of Kleist‘s use of focalization can help sort through the
corresponding confusion and shed light on a further strategy he uses to frustrate or force
work on the reader.
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The narrative confusion begins, of course, with the third person ―omniscient‖
narrator. As mentioned previously, it is easy to take the narrator‘s position for granted,
especially because we tend to automatically trust narrators in general as authoritative
figures with no ulterior motives beyond relaying events—or perhaps because we want to
trust them. Additionally, the narrator here exudes an air of self-confidence and authority
by presenting the account often like an official report or documentation of an event.
However, as Bal points out in Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, every
focalizor binds the text to its own bias and limitations. This can hold true for both
internal focalizors (characters taking part in the story) and external focalizors—for
instance, a third-person narrator not involved in the plot who watches it unfold from
some other vantage point. So, regardless of which focalizor is being employed at any
given moment, there will always be some sort of limitation in narrative because the
focalizor acts as a filter for the way in which we receive information about the events of
the story. This problem is further complicated by the fact that, especially in Kleist‘s
works, it is rarely clear whose perspective is being used, and the focal emphasis can
therefore switch back and forth between characters (or characters and the narrator)
without the reader‘s realization.
If we examine the scene just prior to the father-daughter ―reconciliation scene,‖
for instance, we witness a dialogue between the Marquise and her mother in which it is
difficult to determine whose perspective is being presented. Often, it seems rather
objective, which would indicate an external focalizor (purely the narrator‘s point of
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view); however, some curious moments do emerge. The mother has just informed the
father that she has proven the Marquise‘s innocence, and he is now crying hysterically in
the next room. The Marquise would like to go comfort him, but her mother insists that
she stay and wait for him to approach her:
Meine teuerste Mutter, flehte die Marquise—Unerbittlich! fiel ihr die Obristin ins
Wort. Warum griff er nach der Pistole.—Aber ich beschwöre Sie—Du sollst nicht,
versetzte Frau von G..., indem sie die Tochter wieder auf ihren Sessel
niederdrückte. Und wenn er nicht vor heut Abend kommt, zieh ich morgen mit
dir weiter. Die Marquise nannte dies Verfahren hart und ungerecht. Doch die
Mutter erwiderte: Beruhige dich—denn eben hörte sie jemand von weitem
heranschluchzen: er kömmt schon! (141)
The chaos of the situation and the way observations, words, and actions of the two
characters all flow together seem to imply the presence of a more distant, external,
focalizor who is looking down upon this scene and eavesdropping on their conversation.
However, if this is the case, certain elements of the narrative also seem odd and
somewhat incongruous. For example, why does the text alternate between the actual
dialogue and a narration of it, as is the case when the mother‘s direct statement ―Und
wenn er nicht vor heut Abend kommt […]‖ leads into a summary of the Marquise‘s
statement: ―Die Marquise nannte dies Verfahren hart und ungerecht‖? The latter seems to
be observed with a different lens, perhaps from a more removed position. The occasional
but inconsistent use of indirect speech in Kleist‘s texts (through the subjunctive form)
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achieves a similarly troubling effect, which can be illustrated with an example from the
same scene: ―Hierauf erhob sich die Marquise, umarmte den Kommandanten, und bat
ihn, sich zu beruhigen. Sie weinte selbst heftig. Sie fragte ihn, ob er sich nicht setzen
wolle?― (141). Why isn‘t direct speech used here, as in other passages? The text could
read, for example: „Sie fragte ihn, wollen Sie sich nicht setzen?‖ On the other hand, it is
not merely a statement about what she said, because it includes the question mark. A
more distant narrator may have observed objectively: ―Sie fragte ihn, ob er sich nicht
setzen wollte.‖ The actual account of the Marquise‘s speech thus seems to indicate at once
a presence in the scene and simultaneously a certain distance from it. Perhaps, then, it is
through the filter of the mother‘s eyes that the scene is taking place; this could explain
why the account occasionally seems distorted or even somewhat lacking in attentiveness
(hence the mere narrative summary of what the Marquise said in the previous passage
rather than direct speech)—the mother herself is distracted by the emotion-ridden
circumstances and unable to concentrate. When the scene closes and the Marquise and
her father are left alone, it becomes clearer that the mother‘s vision is being employed, as
our vision follows hers out of the room and we suddenly have access to her thoughts:
Die Marquise sagte, […] er werde krank werden [...] so nahm [die Mutter] wieder
das Wort, sagte, es geschehe ihm ganz recht, er werde nun wohl zur Vernunft
kommen, entfernte sich aus dem Zimmer, und ließ sie allein. Sobald sie draußen
war, wischte sie sich selbst die Tränen ab, dachte, ob ihm die heftige
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Erschütterung, in welche sie ihn versetzt hatte, nicht doch gefährlich sein könnte.
(142)
This shift occurs so discreetly that is easy to forget that we are now ―watching‖
the plot unfold through the mother‘s filter, which, of course has its own limitations and
biases. The bizarreness of the borderline-incestuous scene that follows when she peeps
through the keyhole and observes the ―reconciliation‖ of her husband and daughter
might be explained by this narrative phenomenon. It is clear that, up until this point,
tension and resentment have existed between the Colonel and his wife regarding their
daughter‘s situation, and that the Colonel was acting in such an unloving way that his
wife had to doubt his ability to show love and affection. However, his emotional outburst
and incredible display of remorse eventually revives her faith in him not only as a father
but as a husband. It is then, quite possible, that images of him as her own lover are going
through her mind at the time that she is looking through the keyhole—transposing the
two—and that the narrator, still using her filter, is either unable or unwilling to sort
through the images or provide the appropriate commentary. Such a situation would also
explain the mother‘s lack of bewilderment and shock in the face of this event. However,
due to the narrator‘s lack of clarification, we, as readers, are faced with a major paradox,
as it seems possible that the father himself may have had some kind of sexual relationship
with his daughter that led to her pregnancy.
One instance where a focalization shift causes the reader to question the
reliability of the Marquise‘s claims of innocence occurs when she is questioning the
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midwife about the possibility of immaculate conception after her mother has left the
scene in a rage, exclaiming ―Verflucht sei die Stunde, da ich dich gebar!‖ (127). Again,
indirect speech is employed through the subjunctive and question marks are combined
with indirect questions, making it difficult to pinpoint from whose perspective the
dialogue is taking place.
Sie fragte, [...] ob die Möglichkeit einer unwissentlichen Empfängnis sei?— Die
Hebamme lächelte, [...] und sagte, das würde ja doch der Frau Marquise Fall nicht
sein. Nein, nein, antwortete die Marquise, sie habe wissentlich empfangen, sie
wolle nur im allgemeinen wissen, ob diese Erscheinung im Reiche der Natur sei?
(127–28)
It is interesting that Luke and Reeves translate ―Nein, nein, antwortete die Marquise, sie
habe wissentlich empfangen― as ―‗No, no,‘ answered the Marquise, ‗I conceived
knowingly‘‖ (91), and I believe that the discrepancy between these two versions
illustrates well how easy it is to underread nuances in Kleist‘s narratives and disregard the
importance of the concept of focalization in them. In other passages in the text,
particularly where it focalizes through the Marquise, she does speak in the first person;
yet, despite Luke and Reeves‘s rendering of it in English—with quotation marks and in
first person—in the original, her speech is not directly represented in this passage. A
more accurate translation would be ―No, no, the Marquise answered, she conceived
knowingly.‖ Understanding the details correctly here is crucial to the reader‘s ability to
interpret the rest of the story. Hearing ―I conceived knowingly‖ in direct speech about a
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character who otherwise claims not to know why she is pregnant makes it a much more
troubling passage than ―she conceived knowingly.‖ If we read this passage with the
midwife as a focalizor, it is clear that she does not in any way believe in the Marquise‘s
innocence. The Marquise would certainly be aware of the impossibility of believing her
assertions and is likely embarrassed by the midwife‘s remark about not needing to explain
the ways of the birds and the bees to her. It is possible that the Marquise then plays along
just for the opportunity to ask again if immaculate conception, in general, is possible. If
we were to witness the passage with the Marquise as a focalizor, the text would perhaps
read ―No, no, I conceived knowingly, the Marquise lied,‖ and perhaps more of her inner
feelings and thoughts would be expressed. As is, the sentence is very matter-of-fact, and
therein lies the interpretive difficulty. The midwife has seen dozens of other despairing
young women and is certain that the Marquise conceived knowingly—and we as readers
are relayed that information in a corresponding manner, in spite of its incongruence with
our other impressions about her moral character.
Finally, the ―fateful dash‖ toward the beginning of the story that is often
recognized as the point at which the Marquise is raped represents a further instance of
the narrator‘s failure to address what is actually going on in the narrative. We sense that
the narrator had been using the Marquise‘s perspective up to this point because, as cited
in the previous passage, we learn that the Count ―[schien der Marquise] ein Engel des
Himmels zu sein‖ (108): we cannot know what he seemed to be for her unless the
narration is taking place through her eyes. Yet, when she falls unconscious shortly
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thereafter, her vision stops and the narrative vision has to be taken up through another
character‘s eyes or through the distant vantage point of an external focalizor, which is
sometimes used in the narrative. The interpretive problem here is that we can only
entertain the possibility that something unknown is occurring in the absence of her
consciousness if we are aware that it was her vision in the first place through which we
were experiencing the narrative. If a conscious person—the narrator himself or the
Count—had been the focalizor up to this point, a more explicit reference to the event
likely would have been made, but since the Marquise did not witness it, neither can we.
Thus, in this case again, as in the others, an awareness of the phenomenon of focalization
can help alleviate some of the narrative tension that arises through contrasting character
perspectives.
Kleist takes advantage of moments like these to complicate the plot and to force us
to call the different characters‘ trustworthiness into question. Often, however, the
resulting tension in the narrative is caused less by the nature of these characters
themselves than by the complex framing techniques applied by the narrator. This
phenomenon might explain what Norton refers to as ―the strange moments of emptiness
when the text seems deliberately to be withholding information and hiding meaning‖
(137).
In my opinion, the narrative tactics discussed above are very closely related to the
sense of crisis Kleist experienced when pondering the knowability of the world: in the
same way that we try to pursue knowledge in the world, we find that the ―answer‖ or the
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―truth‖ of his narratives is elusive because the events that occur within them can only be
grasped through filters with limitations. Likewise, it becomes difficult to interpret what is
―really‖ going on in his stories when the point of focalization shifts between characters
and the narrator; yet, what makes this process especially problematic is not the shifting
itself, but the fact that we are being discreetly deceived by the narrator when he does not
make clear whose vision is being presented. By that same token, the frequent and fairly
subtle shifts in focalization might partly explain why we are unaware that the different
perspectives even exist: it all begins to run together, like a stream of consciousness
through the vision of multiple characters. The paradoxes in the plot that emerge for the
critical eye are thus often the result of incomplete accounts from different perspectives
that never quite fit together. As Norton points out, Kleist is reminding us that ―multiple
interpretations of the same event can give rise to all sorts of misunderstandings, great and
small, and to subsequent injustices, real or simply perceived‖ (138). By presenting
narratives that contain irreconcilable puzzles but still manage to maintain a sort of
cohesiveness, Kleist also seems to be presenting us with a sort of metaphor for the way
order in the world can be deceiving. We are drawn to closure and ―closed meaning‖
because it makes us feel secure, but instances of chaos and paradox will always be there to
remind us of the tension that exists throughout the world, and, of course, within our own
narratives.
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Das Erdbeben in Chili16
Das Erdbeben in Chili was published in the Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände17 in
July of 1807 after Kleist returned from his imprisonment in France, and the novella was
initially titled Jeronimo und Josephe. Though much shorter and quite different
thematically from Die Marquise, the narrative tactics employed in Das Erdbeben place
similar demands on the reader by problematizing the reader-text relationship through the
complication of proairetic and hermeneutic codes. The story opens with an earthquake
taking place in seventeeth-century Santiago, Chile, which occurs just in time to free
Josephe and Jeronimo, two ―forbidden lovers‖ condemned for maintaining an illicit affair
and conceiving an illegitimate child while Josephe was living in a convent. As the
earthquake strikes, they are both about to lose their lives—Josephe by public execution
and Jeronimo by a suicidal hanging in his prison cell. Both characters separately manage
to escape while hundreds of others perish, and Josephe is even able to return to the
cloister to retrieve her illegitimate son, Philipp, from the abbess who had been caring for
him since his blasphemous public birth on the Cathedral steps during a procession on the
day of Corpus Christi. The earthquake and its aftershocks destroy a great portion of the
city, killing the viceroy and the archbishop—who ordered Josephe sentenced with the
harshest punishment allowed—, and the two lovers separately wade through the chaos of

Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche Erzählungen und Anekdoten, 148–63. All of my quotes will be taken from
this edition unless otherwise indicated.
17 Das Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände, published by Johann Friedrich Cotta from 1807–1865 in Stuttgart,
was the leading literary newspaper/journal of the early nineteenth century in Germany. It published works
by nearly all of the most prominent authors of the time (See:
http://www.phf.unirostock.de/institut/igerman/ forschung/litkritik).
16
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the quake‘s aftermath to reach places of retreat. Some time later, they happen upon one
another and are reunited in a landscape described with such a sense of sacred love that it
is compared with Eden: ―und [sie] fand ihn hier, diesen Geliebten, im Tale, und Seligkeit,
als ob es das Tal von Eden gewesen wäre‖ (153). Thus, it appears that some greater power
has deemed their society‘s authority unworthy and has denied it the chance to condemn
these two young lovers. The two are relieved but also baffled at the circumstances: on one
hand, they are portrayed as ―sehr gerührt, wenn sie dachten, wie viel Elend über die Welt
kommen mußte, damit sie glücklich würden!― (154). On the other hand, their
traumatizing experiences make it difficult to believe that this freedom will last.
After Josephe and Jeronimo‘s reunification, a harmonious interlude follows,
throughout which the other survivors ―of Eden‖ seem to have forgotten, or at least
forgiven, the charges against the lovers, perhaps in appreciation of their own fortune of
having survived the catastrophe. Josephe is approached by a man named Don Fernando,
who humbly asks her to breastfeed his infant son, as his wife is injured and unable to do
so. Josephe agrees, and she, Jeronimo, and Philipp join Don Fernando‘s family. As a
group, they decide to attend mass in the Dominican church—the only church still
standing—to thank the Lord for blessing them with survival. Jeronimo and Josephe, now
relatively comfortable again in the company of those who previously condemned them,
agree to go as well, still slightly hesitant but soon optimistic that all of the city‘s survivors
will be as forgiving as their current company. Leaving Don Fernando‘s injured wife,
Donna Elvira, and her sister and father behind, the rest proceed in pairs; Josephe walks
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arm-in-arm with Don Fernando and carries his baby, Juan, and Jeronimo walks with Don
Fernando‘s sister-in-law, Donna Constanze, and carries Philipp. However, when they
arrive, they witness not a peaceful, humble sermon from the preacher but, rather, further
outrage over the city‘s moral decay as embodied by the misdeeds of the ―two young
sinners.‖ Ultimately, the earthquake is blamed on them—a sign of God‘s castigation—and
many of the survivors pledge revenge. Josephe is suddenly recognized in the crowd, but
because of the strange pairing of couples, there is some confusion about which man is her
fellow sinner and which baby belongs to her. A mob ensues, and both babies are handed
to Don Fernando. Although he bravely fends off several attackers, eventually everyone in
the party is beaten to death but Don Fernando himself and Baby Philipp. The victims
include his own son, Baby Juan. Despaired but, oddly, quite composed nevertheless, Don
Fernando brings Philipp home, and he and his wife adopt him. The text then ends with a
peculiar observation: ―[…] und wenn Don Fernando Philippen mit Juan verglich, und wie
er beide erworben hatte, so war es ihm fast, als müßt er sich freuen‖ (163).
Closure
As in Die Marquise, the story is relayed in a rather journalistic narrative style,
which gives the initial impression of narrative objectivity; yet, the reader is soon made
aware that this is a pretense due to the many gaps and contradictions—regardless how
subtle—that emerge and create disturbances in the cohesion of the story as the narrator
presents it. The processes of reading and interpretation thus once again surface as central
themes in Kleist‘s work, as not only the characters in the story but also the reader must
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remain suspended in pursuit of often seemingly nonexistent meaning. In true Kleistian
fashion, expectations are left unfulfilled—perhaps even mocked—and questions left
unanswered.
Because Das Erdbeben is shorter and therefore presents less opportunity for
character development in general, the reader is not subject to nearly as much personality
inconsistency in the characters here as in Die Marquise; nonetheless, some odd passages
do stand out. It is interesting, for example, to examine Josephe‘s character according to
the information we receive about her in the first couple of pages, in light of some slightly
suspicious details that arise later in the story. Initially, Josephe, whose father was ―einer
der reichesten Edelleute der Stadt‖ (148), seems to be presented largely as a victim of her
society and times. She and her tutor, Jeronimo, had fallen in love but were prohibited
from being together or marrying because of Jeronimo‘s lower social standing. When they
were discovered continuing their affair by Josephe‘s brother, Josephe was sent to a
convent; yet, the two still found a way to see one another. Josephe doesn‘t appear to be
generally promiscuous or a ―convent whore‖ as she is later called, but, simply, a young
girl desperately in love. The abbess‘s insight seems to support this view of Josephe‘s moral
character when she requests a lighter punishment for Josephe. Despite the shame her
scandal had brought on the convent, it was ―[…] der Wunsch der Äbtissin selbst, welche
das junge Mädchen wegen ihres sonst untadelhaften Betragens lieb gewonnen hatte, die
Strenge, mit welcher das klösterliche Gesetz sie bedrohte, [zu mildern]‖ (149).
Furthermore, when the earthquake takes place and allows her to escape with perfect

54

timing, it seems that God himself is on Josephe‘s side—that perhaps society is in the
wrong rather than she.
Yet, there is something suspicious about how ―well-known‖ Josephe is by other
male characters in the story. For instance, when Don Fernando approaches her to
breastfeed his infant son, the two recognize each other and seem to have some sort of
background: when he asks her this favor, she hesitates, and he then remarks, ―es ist nur
auf weniger Augenblicke, Donna Josephe, und dieses Kind hat, seit jener Stunde, die uns
alle unglücklich gemacht hat, nichts genossen.‖ Josephe replies, ―‗ich schwieg—aus einem
andern Grunde, Don Fernando; in diesen schrecklichen Zeiten weigert sich niemand, von
dem, was er besitzen mag, mitzuteilen‘‖ (155). Thus, they not only recognize each other
but know each other by name as well and make a point to address each other by name. In
the disastrous final scene, it is not Jeronimo who is immediately recognized but Josephe—
by several men, no less. The first is her former cobbler, who confirms her identity when
Don Fernando tries to deny it for her protection; the narrator remarks that this man
―[Josephe] so genau kannte, als ihre kleinen Füße‖ (161). Another man in the crowd,
―Don Alonzo,‖ who tries to support Don Fernando‘s efforts to save the group eventually
brings further wrath on them when he, asked if this woman is indeed Josephe, hesitates:
―Der Schuster rief: Don Alonzo Onoreja, ich frage Euch auf Euer Gewissen, ist dieses
Mädchen nicht Josephe Asteron? [...] nun Don Alonzo, welcher Josephen sehr genau
kannte, [zauderte] mit der Antwort" (162). The strange aspect about Josephe‘s
acquaintance with all of these men is the fact that they do not merely recognize her or
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know her vaguely or fairly well, but they appear to know her quite well; the narrator uses
the expression ―genau kennen‖ more than once.
Moreover, Don Fernando is also a questionable character at times. In the final
scene, he is depicted as a Herculean hero of sorts, holding the two babies in one arm and
fending off the mob—successfully for quite some time—with the sword in his free hand:
―[…] dieser göttliche Held, stand jetzt, den Rücken an die Kirche gelehnt; in der Linken
hielt er die Kinder, in der Rechten das Schwert. Mit jedem Hiebe wetterstrahlte er einen
zu Boden; eine Löwe wehrt sich nicht besser‖ (163). Don Fernando could leave the two
sinners and their baby to their fates with the deadly mob, but, instead, he insists that ―er
wolle eher umkommen, als zugeben, daß seiner Gesellschaft etwas zu Leide geschehe"
(162). His decisions under these circumstances seem to underline his extremely virtuous
qualities, particularly when one considers that his physical description evokes images of a
Greek god or demigod battling some mythical monster. Yet, given the peculiar behavior
between Josephe and Don Fernando, the reader has to wonder if he is defending the
young family purely out of good will or if there are other, concealed circumstances that
lead him to do so.
In her article on this work, Norton proposes an interpretation of the text that
hinges on the possibility of past relations between Don Fernando and Josephe, thus
calling into question the stability of the ―traditional understanding of the central family
structure of Jeronimo, Josephe, and Philipp‖ (138). More specifically, Norton examines
the impossibility of making any assumptions about the true paternity of Baby Philipp or
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the past actions of Josephe due to the manner in which she interacts with Don Fernando.
Indeed, most of the text‘s instability stems from the strange verbal exchanges that take
place between Don Fernando and Josephe and, additionally, the unexpected nature of the
narrator‘s account of Don Fernando‘s sentiments at the novella‘s end. As is typical for
Kleist‘s works, however, the narrative only partially allows for this uncertainty—that is,
it upholds the stability of the ―central family structure of Jeronimo, Josephe, and Philipp‖
just enough to provide superficial closure for the reader. Probably most of what does hold
that structure together is a phenomenon on the level of expectations: namely, a tendency
on the reader‘s part to assume that a narrator will not begin a story with a lie or
deception. Similarly, just as the old saying goes that ―first impressions are the most
important,‖ readers tend to privilege the impressions they form first over contradicting
information that comes later; in this case, the whole story initially appears to revolve
around the consequences of a relationship between Josephe and Jeronimo—potentially
even divine intervention in support of that relationship—, and it is therefore difficult to
imagine why the narrative, instead of closing, would ultimately open itself to a new and
completely different set of circumstances. This paradox illustrates how the text also
capitalizes on the reader‘s desire for cohesive closure despite the rather conspicuous
traces of contradictory evidence left behind to complicate the interpretative process.
What results is once again a plurality of interpretive perspectives: complications
on the level of expectations (level of the proairetic code) that ultimately lead to confusion
and inconclusiveness on the level of questions and answers (level of the hermeneutic
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code). Norton traces, for instance, the interpretive possibility that Don Fernando, rather
than Jeronimo, is the actual father of Philipp. She bases this assertion on their apparent
familiarity with one another and makes a rather strong case for this possibility. She first
addresses the scene in which Don Fernando approaches Josephe in the aftermath of the
earthquake and apparently misinterprets her hesitancy: ―Josephe clearly recognizes in
Don Fernando someone she knew before the earthquake and whose reappearance in her
life is disconcerting‖ (139). Norton admits that it is possible to interpret Josephe‘s unease
as mere discomfort with reemerging as a ―freed person‖ in a society that had condemned
her to death, and this man may have been a member of the nobility that symbolized that
social order. This version is the traditional interpretation of her reaction; however,
Norton entertains the possible explanation that Josephe‘s hesitancy has to do with a past
romance with Don Fernando that makes the situation uncomfortable:
Although there is no denying the fact that Josephe and Jeronimo are indeed a pair
of lovers in the story, it is not wholly implausible to suggest that Josephe might be
a woman of slightly looser morals than is conventionally assumed or that
Jeronimo might not be the only man with whom she has ever been involved.
(139)
Conveniently, the text does allow, if not encourage, the reader to ponder such a situation,
particularly on the second reading after some strange details at the end have been
revealed. As mentioned, Josephe turns out to be ―known well‖ by several different men;
and, if she found the opportunity to maintain relations with Jeronimo while she was in
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the convent, perhaps she had received other visitors as well. By failing to enlighten the
reader further about the background between Don Fernando and Josephe, the text invites
such hermeneutic exploration.
Norton further supports her claims by the odd pairing of couples that presents
itself in the next scene. Why is Josephe paired with Don Fernando instead of Jeronimo?
This image is surely puzzling for any reader who encounters it, at least initially; however,
as always, such details are only vaguely disturbing, and thus it would not be difficult to
overlook their significance if they did indeed turn out to be crucial to the story. For
example, a handful of justifications for the pairings come to mind: perhaps Don Fernando
wanted to accompany Josephe because she was holding his baby, Juan; or, maybe it was a
sign of forgiveness and communal harmony, which would be quite an appropriate image
for this peaceful interlude in the chaos; it could also be that Don Fernando knew how
recognizable Josephe would be and anticipated that he might have to defend her. From
Norton‘s perspective, however, these interpretations are ―underreadings.‖ In the
subsequent scene, Don Fernando is just departing for the Dominican church with
Josephe‘s arm linked in his when his sister-in-law, Donna Elisabeth, calls him back and
has a frantic whispered conversation with him that Josephe is not able to hear. The whole
time still holding Josephe‘s arm, he blushes furiously and tells Donna Elisabeth that
things will be fine and that she should tell his wife to calm herself. Then, oddly, the
narrative continues with the observation that he ―führte seine Dame weiter.—― (159).
Why doesn‘t he let go of Josephe‘s arm, and why is she referred to as his lady and not the
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lady? Even more peculiar and troubling for the reader is the final scene, in which the
mob forms and directly interrogates the two about Don Fernando‘s identity (the sinful
lover?) and the paternity of the child she is holding (Juan), by which they actually mean
Josephe‘s illegitimate child (Philipp), whom Jeronimo is still holding. The entire ordeal is
further complicated by Josephe‘s exclamation as the mob lets loose on her: ―[G]ehn Sie,
Don Fernando, retten Sie Ihre beiden Kinder, und überlassen Sie uns unserm Schicksale!‖
(162). Now, it could be that Josephe is merely saying this to help prevent her child from
being killed, or is she acknowledging Don Fernando as his future, adoptive father?
However, given the already somewhat murky circumstances surrounding Josephe‘s
reputation, this line in the text seems to almost explicitly affirm suspicions that Don
Fernando is indeed somehow the father of her illegitimate child. This possibility could
also explain one detail to which Norton doesn‘t call attention—namely, that the second
paragraph of the story very choppily places two events directly after one another that in
reality would have required an intervening nine months—the ―consummation of
Jeronimo‘s joy‖ in the convent garden and Josephe‘s labor on the Cathedral steps. In light
of potentially different circumstances surrounding Josephe‘s conception, the reader might
recall the awkwardness of this succession of events without any mention of the time that
elapsed between them. Might this suggest that the chronology doesn‘t line up for
Jeronimo to be the father?
Finally, given the ―Don Fernando-as-father‖ interpretation of the story, the very
puzzling concluding line in the text can perhaps more easily be subsumed in the rest of its
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context.18 Norton remarks appropriately: ―This statement raises many questions but
answers virtually none. Once again, the reader must fend entirely for himself‖ (144). No
conventional parent would consider another child superior to his own, especially if that
foreign child had to replace his dead son, so why is this curious observation made?
Following Norton‘s line of thought, it would make sense for Don Fernando to be glad that
he is able to raise his bastard son, Philipp, in a socially acceptable situation—this would
make even more sense if he were more emotionally and physically attached to Josephe as
a lover than to his wife, Donna Elvire.
Regardless of whether a given reader comes to this conclusion or not, the
important issue here is that Kleist‘s texts often offer evidence that can support multiple,
contrasting interpretations—this support is never definitive but exists at least to a
significant extent. Indeed, it is remarkable how easily the reader can jump from one
interpretation to another with sufficient evidence on both sides. Still, I would maintain
that Norton‘s interpretation is, though perhaps the most plausible version, nonetheless
difficult for the reader to adjust and commit to once he has made other assumptions about
Philipp‘s paternity. It is, furthermore, due to the pervasive obscurity of other potentially
contrasting elements of the text that the reader is tempted to ignore, or ―underread‖
them. Yet, it is not Kleist‘s decision or the text‘s decision but, rather, the decision of the
reader himself to disregard this information. This case further supports the observation
that Kleist‘s texts deliberately make the reader aware of the burden of responsibility

―und wenn Don Fernando Philippen mit Juan verglich, und wie er beide erworben hatte, so war es ihm
fast, als müßt er sich freuen‖ (163).
18
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associated with interpretation: the reader, like the members of the crowd in the church,
is put in a position to make a judgment about a group of questionable characters, and that
act of judgment will affect their lives. As both Die Marquise and Das Erdbeben show,
stories or accounts are often more complex than we want to believe; yet, even
recognizing complexity might not be enough because the ―reader‖ or interpreter
ultimately will still seek closure, and complexity often prevents a sense of closure.
Perspectival Plurality
As in Die Marquise, the narrator of Das Erdbeben often seems to be intentionally
withholding information or leading the reader astray. Once again, the narrator‘s
trustworthiness as an objective source of information must be called into question, and an
investigation of focalization techniques employed by Kleist can help uncover one main
method by which narrative obscurity and discord are generated. It seems that, in Kleist‘s
narratives, part of the interpretive obscurity is deemphasized by a general stylistic
obscurity in the text. For instance, when characters speak, Kleist frequently alternates
between direct speech, indirect speech, and free indirect style. These changes often
appear to signify shifts in focal perspectives; however, if the reader is not aware of this
technique, it is easy to write off bizarre scenes or utterances as evidence of an
incongruous or imprecise writing style. Kleist‘s deliberate confusion of information on
the hermeneutic level might thus be disregarded as general confusion in the text; yet, at a
closer glance, the shifts do seem, at least to some degree, systematic, and tracing them can
help support or refute particular interpretive stances, even if it is sometimes difficult to
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pinpoint or verify the focalizor in a particular passage.
First of all, the narrative opens with Jeronimo about to hang himself in his jail
cell. Since he is about to end his life, it makes sense that the narrator might be utilizing
his perspective—his ―eyes‖—to recount the events that led up to his fateful situation
before the earthquake. This might explain the ―jump‖ in time between Jeronimo‘s
opportunity to ―consummate his joy‖ with Josephe and her sudden labor on the steps:
namely, Jeronimo may have had little contact with Josephe in the intermittent months
and that sudden, startling result of his actions was the next event in his life that was
connected with her. Here, we receive no information from Josephe‘s perspective,
although she likely would have gone through a troubling time becoming aware of her
pregnancy, hiding her physical changes from the nuns, etc.
For many of the subsequent passages, the narrator appears to switch back and
forth between Jeronimo‘s and Josephe‘s vision. Once they are reunited, he seems to take
on a more removed perspective, perhaps acting more as an external (i.e., extradiagetic)
focalizor, although he can still relate their thoughts. The next morning, Don Fernando
approaches them, and it is a bit odd that he is first referred to as ―ein wohl gekleideter
Mann mit einem Kinde auf dem Arm‖ and then is identified with his name by Josephe
shortly thereafter. This discrepancy makes it even more conspicuous that the two know
each other. Furthermore, the dialogue that takes place between them switches between
direct and indirect speech. I would argue that the reason for these discrepancies has to do
with a shift in focalization between Jeronimo—who only knows Don Fernando as some
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well-dressed man—and Josephe, who knows him and answers in direct speech once the
focal perspective has shifted to her (―ich schwieg—aus einem andern Grunde […]‖ 155).
A few lines later, however, Don Fernando asks if the two would like to follow him back
to his family‘s camp for breakfast and Josephe‘s answer is this time rendered in indirect
speech: ―Josephe antwortete, daß sie dies Anerbieten mit Vergnügen annehmen würde,
und folgte ihm, da auch Jeronimo nicht einzuwenden hatte, zu seiner Familie […]‖ (155).
It is not clear whose perspective is being used to focalize here, but it is clear that a shift
took place, and such shifts cause blind spots in the narrative that can manipulate the
reader‘s interpretation if he is unaware of them.
One further instance of a blind spot in the narrative that is at least partially
enabled by a narrowed focal perspective is the virtual absence of Jeronimo as a character
during the latter third of the story. After the group decides to proceed to the church,
Jeronimo is only depicted two more times, and briefly and superficially at that: first,
when he attempts to save Don Fernando from scrutiny by revealing his own identity as
the sinner Jeronimo and, lastly, as he is struck fatally to the ground with a club by his
own father. In both instances, Jeronimo is suddenly portrayed as a very flat character—
practically only a name. Once Don Fernando and Josephe are paired up to accompany one
another to the church, it is as if Jeronimo fades away into the background. This
perspectival shift certainly corresponds with the apparent thematic shift that enables the
reader to seriously consider that Don Fernando and Josephe have a secret past together,
especially if it is mostly Don Fernando whose view leads the narrative at this point. Even
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if all of the other characters continue to have the opportunity to talk, their words in the
last four pages or so are almost always directed toward Don Fernando, and it is primarily
his perception of the situation that is described. In the end, it is in fact Don Fernando
who lives to carry Philipp home, and so it is also his focal perspective that becomes the
most dominant and ultimately prevails.
Although it cannot be confirmed exclusively that Don Fernando is the only
focalizor in the last scenes, the story is at least heavily weighted to take place from his
vision—perhaps comparable to a movie in which camera shots alternate between a bird‘seye view and one character‘s line of vision so that the story seems more readily to
confirm the validity of that person‘s view. This lopsided focalization might contribute to
some explanation about why it very suddenly seemed plausible that Don Fernando was
Philipp‘s father. Suppose, for instance, that Josephe did not have past relations with him
but that she was extraordinarily beautiful—something the text never mentions but also
never negates—and/or that he had expressed interest in her at some point and was now
overjoyed to be in her presence. He then would, of course, want to disregard Jeronimo‘s
existence and imagine that Josephe was as enthusiastic about walking arm-in-arm with
him as he was about being so near to her. Wishful thinking often gives people the wrong
impressions with regard to romantic relationships, and this certainly could have been the
case here. If he let himself be misled and the narrator was focalizing through him, then
the reader could have also been misled.
Regardless of what tactics Kleist may or may not have been employing, it is clear
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to the reader here that the complete story can never be told or known because multiple
accounts of an event cannot be recounted simultaneously. Furthermore, each individual
perspective has its own limitations, as we see in the case of Don Fernando, and any
attempt to complement deficient perspectives with other characters‘ perspectives
inevitably leads to chaos and inconclusiveness; this, in turn, causes indecision on the part
of the reader.
As is evidenced by the narrative complexities in Die Marquise and Das Erbeben,
Kleist‘s texts do not merely encourage a ―passive consumption‖ of their contents; quite to
the contrary, they require the reader to engage in an intensive ―dialogue‖ with the text by
locating its gaps and paradoxes and then compensating for these problems by overreading
and underreading in order to negotiate a point of relative cohesiveness or balance. In the
process of doing so, however, a sensitive reader should simultaneously become more and
more aware of the impossibility of ever approaching perfect harmony between the self
(i.e., the reader himself) and the text—or, in other words, between the desire to know
and the potential source of knowledge. Rather like Kleist himself, we, as readers of his
texts, are left in an existential dilemma because we have an unquenchable desire to
―know‖ or uncover the ―truth‖ but soon realize (if we are indeed attentive readers) that
some force in the (story)world is clearly withholding conclusive information and
preventing us from fulfilling this desire. The resulting discord in Kleist‘s work suggests a
significant degree of ―writerliness‖ insofar as it corresponds to Barthes‘s understanding of
the qualities that constitute a ―blissful‖ text: that it discomforts the reader, upturns or
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unsettles his (historical, cultural, and psychological) assumptions, and creates a state of
―loss‖ or longing—in this case, a longing for closure and enlightenment regarding the
ultimate ―truth‖ of the matter. The imposition of a sense of loss is achieved all the more
effectively by causing a crisis of interpretation that is clearly related to what Barthes
identifies as one further notable function of a writerly text—namely, that it ―brings to a
crisis [the reader‘s] relation with language‖ (Pleasure of the Text 14). For language itself is
no more than a representation, and, as Kleist‘s stories make clear, bare language will
always be limited by the subjective perspective that generates it. Yet, a writerly text can
overcome the confines of representation by being ―productive‖ rather than
―representative‖ in that it forces us to write it instead of allowing itself to be deduced to
―some singular system‖ (S/Z 5).
In light of the (admittedly somewhat vague) categorization of Kleist‘s work as
―writerly‖ according to Barthes‘s terms, it is nonetheless important to remind ourselves of
the initial intent behind Barthes‘s distinctions of ―pleasure‖ and ―bliss‖ or ―readerly‖ and
―writerly.‖ For Barthes, the difference is primarily a matter of power structures: a
readerly text is more easily ―consumed‖ because it conforms to our expectations and
reinforces certain cultural norms by leading us from point A to point B, even if some
degree of suspense is involved. The ―pleasure‖ involved is a pleasure associated with the
basic fulfillment of desire—for instance, the desire to ―know,‖ for which narrative closure
provides fulfillment. Yet, while the reader may feel ―fulfilled‖ by narrative closure, the
process he has gone through to reach this point is regarded by Barthes as authorial
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manipulation or domination—that is, the reader can consume the text like a product but
is also subject to being ―dominated‖ by the singularity of its meaning. On the other hand,
a writerly text, which allows for and forces the reader to recognize a plurality of
meaning, encourages the reader to write part of the meaning himself and to thereby, in a
sense, act as a manipulator of the text. For Barthes, it is then perhaps not a criticism of
manipulation that is his concern but, rather, a resistance to the illusory notion of stable
meaning; a passage in S/Z supports this claim: ―The interpretation demanded by a specific
text, in its plurality, is in no way liberal: it is not a question of conceding some meanings,
of magnanimously acknowledging that each one has its share of truth; it is a question,
against all in-difference, of asserting the very existence of plurality, which is not that of
the true, the probable, or even the possible‖ (6).
However, it does seem worth noting that a text that invites/requires a significant
amount of work by the reader does, in effect, force that reader to manipulate the
narrative in an attempt to make it fulfill his desires and/or expectations. This seems to be
an issue that Barthes skims over in the readerly-writerly discussion. Moreover, the
analyses contained in this chapter make it perfectly clear that, despite the definite
―writerly‖ qualities of Kleist‘s narratives, they still pose a significant amount of
manipulation of the reader by the author/text. Therefore, the question remains as to how
we can analyze Kleist‘s novellas in the face of this additional paradox. Is it the author/text
or the reader who is doing the ―manipulating‖ (or both?), and what are the ideological
implications of this power relationship? Due to the centrality of the analysis of power
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relationships in feminist theory, as well as the fact that many of Kleist‘s most important
fictional characters are women, I will explore these questions and related topics via a
feminist critical approach in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
A FEMINIST ANALYSIS
Just as it can be fruitful to examine the process of reading a literary work in order
to gain understanding about how we come to know—or ―read‖—the world, an analysis of
this process can also shed light on the obstacles that prevent us from knowing it or limit
us in our pursuit of making satisfying conclusions about it. I have critically investigated
from a narratology/reader-response standpoint some of the ways in which Kleist‘s work
presents and problematizes the reader/subject‘s epistemological limitations as well as the
external limitations placed on him by the text/world. The analysis thus far has allowed us
to witness the manner in which Kleist was able to demonstrate and grapple with certain
problematic aspects of Enlightenment thought—whose principles dominated the
intellectual milieu in which he was educated—by creating narrative strategies that resist
systems of linear, deductive reasoning and fixed meaning. An additional advantage to
applying a narratology/reader-response approach is the tendency for its conclusions to
support and provide insight into other critical approaches.
One such set of analytical tools is feminist critical theory, which has some
significant points of intersection with narratology and reader-response theory,
particularly when it comes to analyzing an individual‘s limitations and the power
structures in society that impose or influence those limitations. Many scholars have, for
instance, acknowledged the different ways in which the latter theories have opened doors
for further development in feminist thought. In her chapter on the topic of gender in
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David Herman‘s edited volume The Cambridge Companion to Narrative, Ruth Page
discusses a convergence of feminism and narratology in a narratological subdomain called
―feminist narratology,‖ which emerged in the mid-1980s. She credits Susan Lanser with
the conception of this notion, who argued that classical models of narrative theory were,
despite claims of their gender-neutrality, androcentric after all and thus called for
reexamination and revision to more adequately address ―narratives told or read by
women, as well as stories representing female characters. In turn, narratology offered
feminist criticism a useful toolkit of replicable parameters which could elucidate the
forms and functions of women‘s narrative, for example, in pinning down the ways in
which they might (or might not) differ from men‘s‖ (190). Although Kleist himself
obviously was not a female writer,19 his stories do often revolve around female characters,
and the complicated nature of his texts appears to consciously call into question the use of
―classical models‖ of narratives; such models might emphasize narrative features that
feminists tend to associate with the ―masculine‖ or ―male logic,‖ such as linearity and the
stability of gender or identity in general. Page also discusses the debate surrounding the
difference between ―male‖ and ―female‖ plot structures, whereby she cites the work of
theorist Peter Brooks, who has identified one predominant narrative plot pattern as the
―male plot of ambition‖:

A significant amount of speculation does exist, however, about whether Kleist was a latent
homosexual/bisexual, as several lines from letters to his close friend Ernst von Pfuel suggest such tendencies.
Others contend that this material is merely further evidence for his predilection for literary experimentation
by complicating the notion of stable identity with regard to gender, race, class, etc.
19
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[It is] a quest-like progression that moves in a chronological sequence from a
perceived beginning to a conclusion where obstacles have been overcome and
goals achieved. It is labeled ―male‖ on the basis of the sex of the fictional hero,
although this often correlates with the biological status of the author. In addition,
the pattern often reinforces masculine behavior […], and in psychoanalytic terms
mirrors a male, heterosexual pattern of erotic desire, typified as a move toward
climax and release of narrative tension. (198)
While this distinction clearly makes broad generalizations and is therefore somewhat
problematic, it is nonetheless helpful to keep these observations in mind when dealing
with Kleist‘s texts vis-à-vis a feminist approach, precisely because the texts appear to
deliberately subvert this ―plot-of-ambition‖ model. Moreover, although one could likely
make similar observations about numerous Romantic literary works, one could perhaps
say that Kleist‘s texts go one step further by feigning a ―release‖ of narrative tension while
simultaneously upholding it.
Further support for the claim that a feminist critical interpretation can be
informed by the insights of narratology/reader-response theories is provided by Todd F.
Davis and Kenneth Womack in their work Formalist Criticism and Reader-Response

Theory, in which they devote a chapter to the history of reader-response theory‘s
development. One subdivision of this chapter deals specifically with the theory‘s
influence on feminist thought and is prefaced by the following observation: ―Of particular
significance is reader-response criticism‘s theoretical forays into the vital
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interconnections between the act of reading and feminist criticism‘s interpretive aims‖
(73). One example of these ―aims‖ is identified as a critical response to ―patriarchal
resonances in literary works‖ as they relate to female (as opposed to male) readers, and
the authors look at some of the major existing approaches to theorizing the reading
process from a feminist standpoint (73). Rather than asking ―how‖ women read as
opposed to men, the corresponding assertions first attempt to answer what potential
effects might arise from neglecting the possibility of significant differences in the
processes. For instance, according to Patrocinio Schweikart, when a female reads an
andocentric work, she is ―confronted with the requirement of identifying with masculine
points of view in [her] reading [experience].‖ Furthermore, Schweikart‘s work claims that
―[d]uring the reading process, women readers are asked to accept male value systems as
normal and legitimate perspectives of the world,‖ and that such reading experiences
amount to further oppression of women by a male-dominated order (75).
Much of the theoretical work in the field of feminist criticism can serve as a
reminder that neither our worldviews nor our identities are constructed in a vacuum, but
rather, that they are shaped by dominant sociopolitical and sociocultural structures in our
societies. These observations point to women‘s struggles with various aspects of a maledominated society throughout time and one of the feminist movement‘s most broadly
acknowledged ultimate goals: to disturb, deconstruct, and subvert many of the
assumptions behind any order that misrepresents women and neglects or oppresses their
true identities by failing to provide an adequate value system. In A Reader‘s Guide to
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Contemporary Literary Theory, Raman Selden et al. point out that, in fact, feminist
critical theory perhaps should not be referred to as a ―theory‖ at all because of the term‘s
association with ―male-invented‖ empiricism: ―Indeed some feminists have not wished to
embrace theory at all, precisely because […] ‗theory‘ is often male, even macho […] and
as part of their general project, feminists have been at pains to expose the fraudulent
objectivity of male ‗science‘[.]‖ Selden et al. attribute this feminist resistance to being
―tied down‖ to a particular conceptual position to their refusal of the ―(masculine) notion
of authority or truth‖ as presented by ―male-formulated‖ discourse (116).
Despite Kleist‘s position as a male author, we can see apparent similarities in his
struggles and ultimate aims in the literary realm; for instance, his writing shows that he
was, quite unquestionably, dissatisfied with ―classical models‖ of narrative, as mentioned
above, as well as classical models of aesthetics. In possibly every work he wrote, his
narrative strategies challenge those traditional Enlightenment values that are often
perceived by feminist thinkers as ―male‖ or ―patriarchal‖ values, such as logic, certainty,
order, and justice. Furthermore, ambiguity, lacking closure, and various other elements in
his narrative structures conspicuously call these values into question. And although some
veins within feminist thought privilege literature written by women, it is possible to
establish a connection between Kleist‘s works and feminist ideals by focusing on the
degree of the texts‘ ―feminine writing-effect‖ (l‘ecriture feminine20) rather than the

The concept l‘ecriture feminine was introduced and developed primarily but not exclusively through the
works of the French feminist critics Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva and the Belgian critic Luce Irigaray, all
of whom place more emphasis on the structure of a text itself and the way signifiers are employed within it
20
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gender of their author (Selden et al. 122). According to Selden et al., feminists who
endorse literary analysis via the concept of l‘ecriture feminine ―do not see writing as
specifically gendered but seek to disrupt fixed meaning; they encourage textual freeplay
beyond authorial or critical control; they are anti-humanist, anti-realist, and antiessentialist; and they represent, in effect, a potent form of political, cultural and critical
deconstruction‖ (137). Although Kleist‘s oeuvre itself belongs to the German literary
canon and in that respect might still be considered by many to belong to the ―master
narrative‖ that feminists seek to deconstruct, a closer look reveals many parallels between
the feminist and Kleistian objectives: namely, both endeavor to identify and battle the
(known and unknown) oppressive constraints placed on the individual by his or her
sociopolitical or sociocultural paradigm.
We‘ve already examined several ways in which Kleist‘s works resist and confound
order and logic structurally; appropriately, the overturning of order and logic are very
common thematic motifs in his novellas as well. Die Marquise opens, for instance, with a
chaotic attack on Colonel G…‘s citadel that escalates into a sexual-assault scene and
possible rape (depending on one‘s interpretation of the dash). The Marquise‘s father, the
main patriarchal figure in the novella, is defeated in more than just one way: his citadel is
seized and his only daughter is sexually assaulted and/or raped. Yet, the cause of the
unnecessary damage to the property and the jeopardization of his family was perhaps less
a sense of ruthlessness on the side of the Russian attackers than the Colonel‘s own

than the gender of the author; this means that l‘ecriture feminine also can be, and has been, employed by
male writers (see: Selden et al. 137).
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obstinacy and refusal to capitulate: ―Der Feind, seinerseits, bombardierte die Zitadelle. Er
steckte die Magazine in Brand, eroberte ein Außenwerk, und als der Kommandant, nach
einer nochmaligen Aufforderung, mit der Übergabe zauderte, so ordnete er einen
nächtlichen Überfall an, und eroberte die Festung mit Sturm― (108). This incident marks
an instance of paternal neglect toward his ―subordinate‖ family for the sake of trying to
maintain the ―status quo‖ and the order of his domain.
Once peace has been settled and an ―order‖ of sorts has been restored, another
unsettling event reveals itself through the paradox of the Marquise‘s apparent immaculate
conception. The possibility of her having unknowingly conceived calls another system of
order into question, namely, the laws of nature, according to which immaculate
conception is not humanly possible (unless one believes in the immaculate conception of
the Virgin Mary). The Marquise is positive of her innocence and, in fact insists on it, as
she is not aware of having had sexual intercourse. Yet, her prior experience with
pregnancy serves as a basis for troubling suspicions to the contrary: ―[W]ie kann ich mich
beruhigen. Hab ich nicht mein eignes, innerliches, mir nur allzuwohlbekanntes Gefühl
gegen mich? Würd ich nicht, wenn ich in einer andern meine Empfindung wüßte, von
ihr selbst urteilen, daß es damit seine Richtigkeit habe?― (124–25). After she dismisses the
doctor for ―lying‖ when he confirms her pregnancy, she can only partially believe that
this was indeed a cruel joke, because she herself had entertained these suspicions as well.
After sharing the doctor‘s ―audacious‖ remarks with her mother, she frantically weighs
the two possibilities and despairs over the dilemma caused by the great unlikelihood of
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both. Her mother responds: ―und gleichwohl muss es doch notwendig eins oder das
andere gewesen sein‖ (125). Here, we are introduced to a paradox that—at least
momentarily—calls the entire order of nature as we know it into question. Must B be
caused by A, as conventional logic would propose? The Marquise attempts to gain more
information from both the doctor and a midwife about the plausibility of immaculate
conception in her case and faces ridicule each time—but what, then, could be the
explanation? This personal crisis evokes again a sense of disorientation regarding the
possible unreliability of reason. The contradiction with which the Marquise and her
family are faced has a polarizing effect on the characters: either they are willing to at least
entertain the thought of a flaw in the system of reason and natural laws, or they must
necessarily mistrust the Marquise‘s assertion of her innocence. As readers, we ourselves
even begin to wonder whether the Marquise is actually telling the truth, because, just as
her mother emphasized, it would have to be ―eins oder das andere‖—or is it possible that
a defect in reason is being revealed?
By allowing doubt about the value of reason to surface—and sustaining this sense
of doubt for some time—Kleist seems to be calling into question the authority of the
Enlightenment tradition that is based on this value. According to reason, either the
Marquise is pregnant and knows the cause or the doctor is lying. The ―correct‖
interpretation of this situation is bound to the two options and is therefore closed. Yet,
the atmosphere of crisis elicited by this ―either-or‖ dilemma also challenges, in a feminist
sense, the patriarchal order of binary Enlightenment reason. The notion that ―men‘s
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domination of discourse has trapped women inside a male ‗truth‘‖ (Selden et al. 131) is
being subverted by the mere possibility of a different kind of ―truth,‖ and thus we witness
the unfolding of a further dimension of destabilization in Kleist‘s texts. Appropriately, it
is the female in this story, the Marquise, and the unclear circumstances surrounding her
sexual morality that pose a threat to the ―patriarchal value‖ of closed, fixed meaning.
Moreover, it is—again, appropriately—her father who is the most deeply affected—
indeed, nearly driven insane—by this paradox and the failure of his ―logic‖ to bring him
to a satisfying conclusion.
In Erdbeben in Chili, we witness a much more far-reaching and literal
overturning of the patriarchal order when the earthquake hits Santiago. When the two
lovers Jeronimo and Josephe are ―saved,‖ it appears that God or some other force has
stepped in to defend their cause against an unjust social order. Despite their relief, there
remains an eerie sense about this sudden absence of order and a vague foreboding of what
the consequences of this power vacuum might turn out to be.
The damage is extensive: not only is the convent in which Josephe was housed
completely destroyed, along with the bishop and all of the nuns in that convent, but the
Viceroy of the city himself, who decreed the lovers‘ sentences, has also fallen victim to
the disaster. The narrator‘s reporting of this news further underlines, in addition to the
physical destruction of their surroundings, the subversion of the religious and political
hierarchies previously in place. Beyond the collapse of their society as such, we also
witness a deep contrast between transformations in the way the ground itself—society‘s
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dwelling place—is portrayed. The lovers must make their way through the rubble of
buildings, gates, and other symbols of human achievement until they finally reach one
another; yet once they do reunite, this landscape of broken barriers exudes the character
of a harmonious, pre-hierarchal society and is celebrated as if it were the Garden of Eden.
However, just as there is uncertainty about the meaning of this strange event and what
the future will bring, the depiction of this new ―ground‖ is shifting and ambiguous, thus
emphasizing a sense of instability. In her article ―Patriarchy's Fragile Boundaries under
Siege: Three Stories of Heinrich von Kleist,‖ Marjorie Gelus identifies contrasting
possibilities: is it ―a sanitized nature based on Rousseau‘s model,‖ ―a much more
dangerous nature that nullifies the symbolic order on which patriarchy rests,‖ or ―a barely
veiled continuation of patriarchal relations‖ (63)? Josephe and Jeronimo choose to trust
that the danger has subsided, and their interpretation appears to be confirmed initially, as
the survivors all appear to be working together as a cooperative and understanding
community in a new order of peace:
Und in der Tat schien, mitten in diesen gräßlichen Augenblicken, in welchen alle
irdischen Güter der Menschen zu Grunde gingen, und die ganze Natur
verschüttet zu werden drohte, der menschliche Geist selbst, wie eine schöne
Blume, aufzugehen. Auf den Feldern, so weit das Auge reichte, sah man
Menschen von allen Ständern, durcheinander liegen, Fürsten und Bettler,
Matronen und Bäuerinnen, Staatsbeamte und Tagelöhner, Klosterherren und
Klosterfrauen: einander bemitleiden, sich wechselseitig Hülfe reichen […] als ob
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das allgemeine Unglück alles, was ihm entronnen war, zu einer Familie gemacht
hätte. (156)
Drawing on Lacan‘s distinction between the paternal and the maternal through
patriarchy‘s dependence on signification, Gelus characterizes this ―maternal interlude‖ as
―reduced to the visible, the pre-symbolic,‖ while the patriarchal power structure
destroyed by the quake represents ―a more abstract and invisible reality, the reality of
paternity, whose authority the entire patriarchal system, including the signifying system,
is set up to assert‖ (61). Furthermore, the patriarchal system of law—by which the
Viceroy determined Josephe and Jeronimo‘s offense prior to the disaster—is replaced by
the ―authority of maternity‖ when Josephe‘s breastmilk is needed to feed Don Fernando‘s
infant son. This event further disrupts a system of fixed meaning associated with the
patriarchal order, as it renders Josephe‘s identity (or representations of her) unstable. As
Gelus points out, perceptions of her shift ―among fallen woman, madonna, [and] mother
outside the patriarchal signifying chain,‖ whereas the ―signifying chain of patriarchy‖
would have permitted only one of three identifies for women: ―virgin, madonna, [or]
whore‖ (62–63).
Unfortunately, this instability must eventually submit to restored order when
Josephe is killed; likewise, the peaceful interlude is violently brought back under
patriarchal control. It is interesting to note that the confusion of identity that pervades
the final church scene is ended definitively by Jeronimo‘s father when he betrays his son
by revealing him as the ―real‖ Jeronimo. Like the Colonel in Die Marquise, Jeronimo‘s
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father is more concerned with reinstituting the status quo than supporting his child,
however misguided that child may appear to be. Furthermore, the confusion surrounding
Philipp‘s paternity is superficially dispelled with Don Fernando‘s adoption of him at the
conclusion of the story. This points thematically to what Gelus refers to as the system‘s
intolerance to ambiguity (particularly paternal ambiguity), and, accordingly, this is one
problem that Kleist constantly ironizes in his work: an overconfidence in logic and the
consequent blind tendency to impose solutions where they don‘t fit for the sake of
maintaining structure and order. This is the process that traps not only wives and
daughters but also even sons under patriarchal value systems with which they cannot
identify.
Thus, while the stories of Die Marquise and Das Erbeben develop in the midst of
remarkably different sets of circumstances, we do see some thematic parallels and
common motifs between the two. On the most obvious level, both plots revolve around
events that seem incompatible with logic and thus trigger the consideration of divine
intervention or some other force that acts outside the realm of reason. The characters
directly involved are then left suspended between two rather unlikely interpretations of
the ―unerhörten Begebnisse‖ happening to them, which reinforces Kleist‘s preoccupation
with the idea of uncertainty and unknowability. Moreover, both stories involve an
overturning of order in both a literal and a figurative sense. On one level, power
structures are physically destroyed, both in the case of the citadel in Die Marquise and
the greater part of the city of Santiago, along with its institutions, in Das Erdbeben. The
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physical lack of order that characterizes several of the novellas‘ scenes further supports
this theme. Yet, it is the intense mental chaos portrayed that drives the sense of urgency
in the narrative, and with this, we see a more figurative display of the subversion of
order. The mere existence of speculation that an incredible event has occurred in a way
that offers no logical explanation serves as a challenge for the reader to step outside his or
her intellectual paradigm and consider such a possibility.
However, while Kleist challenges the reader to entertain such thoughts, he
simultaneously seems to aspire to undermine the reader‘s ability to do so through the
complex narrative strategies that he employs. This brings us back to the readerly-writerly
debate and the question of manipulation posed at the end of the previous chapter: if
indeed Kleist‘s works aspire to disrupt and subvert a system of thought that represents
domination and force, then why does he so blatantly taunt and manipulate the reader? I
would argue that this is a rhetorical strategy aimed at increasing the reader‘s awareness of
and sensitivity to the ways in which a) social structures and values compel us to comply
with and participate in an oppressive system and b) our complicity, while perhaps
partially a matter of human nature, nonetheless reinforces the structures that, at the same
time, also have the potential to oppress us. An examination of the problematization of
justice in Kleist‘s works can, for instance, add support to this idea.
Issues of legality and justice are prevalent themes in nearly all of Kleist‘s work,
including Die Marquise and Das Erdbeben. Both the Marquise and Josephe are subject to
either undue or excessive judgment and punishment due to their socially unacceptable
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pregnancies. For instance, because of the murky circumstances surrounding the
Marquise‘s actions in the narrative, the reader is, at times, left to form his own
conclusions about what has ―really‖ happened and whether her perspective should be
trusted. By creating ambiguity but leaving behind traces of evidence that could

potentially discredit her, Kleist is anticipating and playing on the reader‘s urge to make a
judgment via deductive reasoning that is based on stereotype and prejudice. The same
phenomenon in Das Erdbeben allows the reader to ―overread‖ and thereby come to
suspect further sexual relations in Josephe‘s life and other possibilities for Philipp‘s
paternity. Thus, these women are subject to (potentially) unfair judgment not only by the
societies in their storyworlds but also by the reader—even if only momentarily. While
the process of interpretation necessarily involves the task of making judgments, the
tendency to do so points to the difficulty for the reader to remain suspended in
uncertainty because it is too unstable. Like the mob at the end of Das Erdbeben, the
reader eventually desires a quick return to order. The result is an exertion of power over
the text by making an assumption (e.g., about a character‘s actions) that allows for the
dissolution of tension and the desired closure.
The issue of a text‘s domination by the reader is also addressed in feminist theory.
The Davis/Womack volume includes in its section on the intersections between readerresponse theory and feminist critical theory a compelling summary of a series of studies
conducted by Elizabeth A. Flynn, who sought to obtain data with which she could
determine how to establish a ―feminist model of reading.‖ Her findings indicated that
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―male students frequently seemed to dominate (and, in some cases, remain detached
from) the text and pass judgment on its characters.‖ She found that the female students,
on the other hand, ―achieve very different sorts of balances between detachment and
involvement in the text. They typically reserve passing judgment, sympathize with the
text‘s characters, and seem willing to submit to the text, rather than attempt to dominate
it‖ (76). While these characterizations are, again, quite generalized and may or may not
ultimately depend on the reader‘s gender (gender studies proponents would point out
that gender and sexual preference exist not in a binary fashion but on a continuous
spectrum), it may be useful to connect the manner of reading coded here as ―male‖ to the
issue of judgment in Kleist‘s works. That is, power relations within the Kleistian reading
experience can serve as a microcosm for the situations and social forces we face in our
lives: the world is—despite comfort and security offered by science and reason—largely
unknowable and often does seem to taunt us with what we can‘t know; however, as we
should realize when encountering Kleist‘s texts, we must be wary of falling into the habit
of assuming that we can always know or that a readily available answer exists, as such
assumptions can lead us to reach false conclusions and make inaccurate judgments.
Whether or not we can justify labeling it ―male‖ or ―masculine,‖ a dominating manner of
reading the world is indeed the kind of ―reading‖ that continually reinforces imbalanced
social structures, misrepresentation, and injustice. It appears that it was Kleist‘s aim to
make this connection conspicuous and cause the reader to ponder not only the ultimate
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futility of seeking objective knowledge but also the implications of a social order in which
such thought patterns are fostered and maintained.
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CONCLUSION
As both the narratology/reader-response and feminist critical analyses indicate,
Kleist‘s works Die Marquise and Das Erdbeben set out not only to make a statement about
the inadequacy of Enlightenment principles but also to personally and directly engage the
reader in the epistemological and aesthetic problems with which he struggled so
intensely. With Kleist‘s philosophical anguish in mind, Gelus characterizes his works as a
―battlefield for his own idiosyncratic collision of values, enacting the split within himself
between the steadfast upholder of patriarchal values and the androgynously subversive
dismantler of stable meaning‖ (60). Indeed, it is his unique treatment of the very idea of
―splitting,‖ or fragmentation, in and through his works that makes them so challenging
for readers and, yet, so powerful that they remain ―[s]eit gut hundert Jahren, seit Beginn
der Moderne […] aus dem literarischen Leben nicht mehr wegzudenken.‖21 Just as Kleist
was confronted with the concept that the perceiving subject can never know the true
essence an object—or the Ding-an-sich— and therefore must come to terms with a
fissure between the two, so must the Kleistian reader also face a division between himself
and the story‘s reality. This split also has implications in the realm of power relations,
since the inability to ―know‖ and name something (or pin down its meaning) prevents a
process of objectification in which the subject comes to dominate the object. To extend
this to the literary realm, the Kleistian reader is ultimately prohibited from dominating
the text in the manner that Barthes describes—that is, the reader cannot simply
Walter Müller Seidel, ed., ―Nachwort,‖ Heinrich von Kleist: Sämtliche Erzählungen und andere Prosa
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1984) 355.
21
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―consume‖ it like an object but must grapple with its infinite resistance to closure. By
forcing the reader to overread and underread in order to pursue a nonexistent point of
closure, Kleist is able to reveal to the reader his drive to seek knowledge and the sense of
dominance that accompanies it; yet, despite the reader‘s attempts to arrive at conclusive
meaning, the text does not allow itself to be dominated in the end. As with Kleist‘s
metaphor of the ―grüne Gläser‖22—through which he explains that humans will never be
able to know whether they are observing objects for what they truly are or whether their
―eyes‖ are adding some quality to these objects which makes them appear so—the reader
faces a troubling dilemma: is he ―seeing‖ the story as it is, or is his inner eye altering it to
fit a certain pattern of expectations? These questions lead once again to Kleist‘s
constructivist perception of reality and the consequent problem of representation
expounded on in the introduction. Hinrich Seeba23 recognizes the importance of the
image of the eye in Kleist‘s texts and views his project as a test of the eye
as to whether it can show ―die Dinge wie sie sind‖ or whether the eye, being no
longer mimetic but a creative sensory medium, adds (―hinzutut‖) something to
what in the Enlightenment—and in historicism, for that matter—the mind was
expected to point out, to represent, and to reproduce without any subjective […]
interference. While in most of pre-Kantian epistemology it was only beauty, not
truth, that was seen in the eye of the beholder, Kleist […] made the eye—both the
act of seeing and the point of view—the critical issue of the search for truth. (113)
See epistolary excerpt on page 10.
Hinrich Seeba, ―Kleist‘s Visual Poetics of Knowledge,‖ A Companion to the Works of Heinrich von Kleist,
ed. Bernd Fischer (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003) 103–22.
22
23
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This reference to the eye not only as a symbol for seeing/knowing but also for
emphasizing the subjective point of view brings up a further realm in which Kleist‘s texts
have proven to present and problematize a kind of ―split‖ with respect to the pursuit of
knowledge. First of all, his implementation of discrepant focalizors as a narrative strategy
poses a complicated intermingling of character perspectives that enables the reader to
witness the fragmentation of truth due to differing perspectives. Additionally, because of
the labyrinthian interpretive process that the reader must undergo, he finds within

himself varying hermeneutic realities that may ultimately cause him to question his own
character. For instance, coming to understand the famous ―dash‖ in Die Marquise as a
rape scene, according to Michel Chaouli,24 is one such instance where the reader is forced
to recognize his own dynamic imaginative potential: ―In meeting a part of ourselves in
the text, something rather more disquieting occurs, for we have, without meaning to,
opened the possibility of observing our own work of fantasy production‖ (75). He
remarks, furthermore, that this kind of active reading is not narcissistic because we
cannot merely allow it to ―mirror what we already know,‖ but through our work, it
―opens a path to the reader‘s encountering something far more disturbing than a
difference to and within the text: namely a difference within him- or herself‖ (75).
Hence, by destabilizing meaning in his texts and making the reader aware of the
impossibility of establishing a stable interpretive stance, Kleist has forced the reader to
realize in himself the possibility for a split or unstable identity as well.

Michel Chaouli, ―Irresistible Rape: The Lure of Closure in ‗The Marquise of O…,‖ Yale Journal of Criticism
17.1 (2004): 51–81.
24
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Insofar as Die Marquise and Das Erdbeben cause the reader to experience this
instability firsthand, they embody, to a large extent, the characteristics that Helfer uses to
describe Kant‘s definition of Negative Darstellung of the sublime, which he considered
the most adequate form of ―pure representation‖25—a manner of presentation that
transcends mere objective representation. Namely, these texts bring the reader to an
understanding of the problem of epistemological crisis without producing it objectively
and directly but, rather, by performing and enacting the corresponding tensions so that
they resonate in the reader. These tensions include those outlined in the previous
paragraph: the futility of seeking objective knowledge, or stable meaning; inherent
contradiction between subjective points of view with regard to accounts of event; and the
dynamic nature of the individual‘s interpretive stance due to unconscious subjective
input. Even if stable meaning or objective knowledge were to exist—which we can never
know—, then all of these factors would contribute to a distortion of that knowledge. The
only thing that Kleist (or anyone, for that matter) is able to ascertain for certain is that we

cannot ever really know anything—and this he is able to communicate directly to the
reader, not (or not only) via a mere representation of the problem but by subjecting the
reader to the problem itself.
Although—or perhaps precisely because—Kleist sought a literary form that might
more adequately and truly address the realities of the turbulently shifting worldviews and
social power structures of his time, his work appears to have gone largely unappreciated
until after his death; the disappointment Kleist experienced due to the failure of many of
25

See citation from Helfer‘s work on page 7.
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his dramas—which he considered the ―higher‖ form or genre of literature—was
reportedly one of the driving forces behind the depression that eventually led to his
suicide in late November of 1811.26 He is now, however, widely recognized as an
influential protomodernist in that his work is said to have affected the development of
key German modernist writers such as Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann. His influence on
Kafka is particularly notable and is also the subject of much scholarly work. Furthermore,
as noted previously, Kleist‘s grip on the international literary audience has not
diminished since his death.27 Thus, although Kleist himself was, like a character out of
one of his novellas, perhaps only one of many voices of the Romantic era vying for his
own approach to achieving legitimacy and truth—he was nonetheless able to make a
significant and lasting impact on modern literary aesthetics. And while the tracing of his
reception and influence is an interesting topic for another day‘s discussion, it is
worthwhile to note the irony of this situation in light of the anxiety he expressed to his
fiancée Wilhelmine when facing the realization that knowledge acquired ―subjectively‖
must also cease to exist when the subject does: ―Wir können nicht entscheiden ob das,
was wir Wahrheit nennen, wahrhaft Wahrheit ist, oder ob es uns nur so scheint. Ist das
letzte, so ist die Wahrheit, die wir hier sammeln, nach dem Tode nicht mehr—und alles
Bestreben ein Eigentum sich zu erwerben, das uns auch in das Grab folgt, ist vergeblich

In the afterword to Sämtliche Erzählungen und Anekdoten, Schlaffer relates a remark made by Clemens
Brentano in a letter to Achim von Arnim a few weeks after Kleist‘s death: ―‗Überhaupt werden seine
Arbeiten oft über die Maßen geehrt, seine Erzählungen verschlungen. Aber das war ihm nicht genug; ja,
Pfuel sagt mir, daß sich vom Drama zur Erzählung herablassen zu müssen ihn grenzenlos gedemütigt hat‘‖
(305).
27 See pages 2, 29.
26
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[...]‖ (Sämtliche Werke und Briefe 634). The ―truths‖ or insights that Kleist was able to
―collect‖ during his lifetime, despite how bound to his own perspective they may have
been, did not follow him into the grave but live on through the revivification process that
the reader-text relationship enables. The inevitability of fragmented knowledge or
meaning thus also has a brighter side that should not be dismissed: it survives in part to
help readers come to new realizations and truths.
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